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ABSTRACT
Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists are divided on whether
voter initiatives and legislative referendums tend to produce outcomes that are
more (or less) majoritarian, efficient, or solicitous of minority concerns than
traditional legislation. Scholars also embrace opposing views on which lawmaking mechanism better promotes citizen engagement, registers preference
intensities, encourages compromise, and prevents outcomes masking cycling
voter preferences. Despite these disagreements, commentators generally assume that the voting mechanism itself renders plebiscites more democratic
than legislative lawmaking. This assumption is mistaken.
Although it might seem unimaginable that a lawmaking process that directly engages voters possesses fundamentally antidemocratic features, this Article defends that very claim. To do so, this Article constructs a set of
comparative analytical benchmarks based upon an assessment of the democratic features of representative legislatures and the antidemocratic features of
appellate judiciaries, and employs those benchmarks to evaluate direct
democracy.
This analysis reveals two critical yet overlooked features of direct democracy: First, direct democracy incorporates many of the theoretical and practical difficulties associated with judicial review. Second, direct democracy risks
producing outcomes that embed cycling preferences by eliminating voter
choice over the policymaking institution itself and over the range of policy
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matters combined for simultaneous negotiation. The core insight that emerges
is not merely that common understandings about direct democracy are misguided; rather, it is that recognizing the antidemocratic features of direct democracy proves essential in determining the sorts of public policy questions
that are, or are not, suitable to this form of policymaking.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists have expressed
divergent views on the wisdom and efficacy of voter initiatives and
legislative referendums. The literature reveals sharp divisions on
whether, as compared with traditional legislation, direct democracy
better aligns policy with majoritarian preferences, encourages efficient
provision of government services, and protects the interests of various
demographic minorities.1 Despite such disagreements, scholars generally assume that direct voter involvement renders plebiscites more
democratic than alternative methods of lawmaking. This assumption
is mistaken.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, plebiscites are not inherently
democratic.2 If we treat representative legislatures and appellate judicial decisionmaking as endpoints representing more and less democratic forms of policymaking, respectively, direct democracy possesses
critical features that more closely resemble the antidemocratic features of judicial decisionmaking than the democratic features of representative governance. At first blush it might seem unimaginable that
direct democracy, an institution that facilitates direct voter involvement in creating public policy, possesses fundamentally antidemocratic features. This Article defends that very claim. It further
See generally infra Part I (reviewing literature).
Throughout this Article, I use the phrase “direct democracy” to describe various forms
of plebiscite. The term “plebiscite” refers to the process of having the electorate vote on a
substantive matter of policy, as opposed to affecting a public policy by voting for representative
legislators who then formulate and enact it. Plebiscite is an umbrella term that primarily embraces two different methods: (1) “voter initiatives,” also called simply “initiatives” or “direct
initiatives,” through which “the proposed statute or constitutional amendment is placed on the
ballot automatically once proponents gather the required number of signatures,” and (2) “referendums,” which “allow[ ] the people to intervene after the legislature has acted on a proposal; in
this process, voters are asked to approve or disapprove a law or constitutional amendment that
the legislature has already passed.” Elizabeth Garrett, Direct Democracy and Public Choice, in
THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 137, 137 (Daniel A. Farber &
Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). This article will use these terms, and also introduce variations on these methodologies, as is appropriate to the specific form of direct democracy being
discussed.
1
2
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explores the normative implications for several prominent Supreme
Court doctrines and questions of public policy.
Scholars have directly compared the processes of lawmaking via
initiatives and referendums with legislative lawmaking based upon
such norms as promoting citizen engagement, registering strength of
preference, promoting deliberation and compromise, and even avoiding outcomes embedding voter preferences that cycle.3 One persistent
difficulty has been identifying common normative benchmarks for
meaningful institutional comparisons. Without such benchmarks,
comparisons between direct and representative lawmaking are inevitably limited by problems of selective examples, availability of data
and measurement, or contestable analytical premises.
This Article helps to overcome several of these analytical difficulties. Relying upon social choice analysis, the Article identifies a common set of normative benchmarks for relevant institutional
comparisons. In addition, the Article expands the range of comparisons to include not only direct democracy and representative legislatures, but also appellate judicial tribunals. The analysis demonstrates
that in contrast with representative legislatures, direct democracy possesses critical features that are (rightly) considered antidemocratic in
the context of judicial decisionmaking. Both institutions—appellate
tribunals and direct democracy—break off discrete legal or policy
questions, cast them along isolated normative dimensions, and ensure
outcomes, that, under ideal or preferred conditions, coincide with the
preferences of the institution’s median member. By contrast, representative legislatures spread policymaking over multiple issue dimensions and provide mechanisms that allow members and affected
constituents not only to register ordinal preferences along discrete
policy dimensions, but also to express preference intensities over multiple dimensions respecting matters of particular concern. In contrast
with both direct democracy and appellate judicial tribunals, legislatures often thwart the median member’s ideal point along isolated
policy dimensions.
This analysis reveals two critical yet overlooked features of direct
democracy: First, direct democracy incorporates many of the theoretical and practical difficulties associated with judicial review. Second,
direct democracy risks producing outcomes that embed cycling preferences by eliminating voter choice over either the controlling institution or the range of policy matters combined for simultaneous
3

See infra Part I (reviewing literature).
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decision. The core insight emerging from this analysis is not merely
that descriptive claims about plebiscites are often misguided; rather, it
is that recognizing the antidemocratic features of direct democracy is
essential in determining the sorts of public policy questions that are,
or are not, suitable to this form of policymaking.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the competing
views in the literature on the merits of direct democracy. Part II constructs a social choice framework that allows a three-way institutional
comparison of legislatures, appellate courts, and direct democracy as a
means of assessing the normative merit of direct democracy. Part III
revisits the debates described in Part I based upon the social choice
framework of Part II, and offers a normative assessment of how the
Supreme Court should consider the process of enacting various forms
of state law—those that are the product of various forms of direct
democracy and those that are the product of ordinary legislative
processes—in the course of constitutional judicial review.
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY

IN

THEORY

AND

PRACTICE

This Part begins with a basic model that frames inquiries about
direct democracy, and then considers theoretical, methodological, and
empirical arguments for and against direct democracy.
A. Basic Principles
Defenders of direct democracy claim that initiatives and referendums allow voters to ameliorate agency slack that pervades the relationship between legislators and constituents.4 The most notable
source of slack—interest group influence on legislators—is widely
known and its mechanisms fairly well understood.5 Public choice
analysis, and more specifically interest group theory, reveals an inher4 See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 548–49 (2009) (reviewing literature and collecting authorities). The word
“slack” refers to the latitude afforded an agent as a result of monitoring costs. Agency slack
causes a divergence between the preferences of the principal and the policy outputs of the agent
and can arise in various settings, including, for example, between voters and legislators or between legislators and executive officers, administrative agencies, or other officials who are assigned the task of carrying out enacted legal policies. See, e.g., Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C.
Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 619 (2010) (describing slack between voters and policymakers); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110 (2005) (describing slack
between legislators and agencies). This Article uses the terms “agency slack,” “principal-agent
slack,” and “legislative-agent slack” as is appropriate to the specific context under review.
5 See, e.g., STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 49–50, 69–72.
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ent irony in legislative lawmaking. The very mechanisms designed to
protect against majority tyranny by making legislation more difficult
to procure serve as venues for special interest influence.6
To ensure that minority constituencies are not plagued by what
James Madison and David Hume termed “factions,”7 the United
States Congress, for example, operates with a complex system of
“veto gates,”8 or “negative legislative checkpoints.”9 These impediments to passing legislation have the benign consequence of allowing
those likely to be uniquely burdened by legislative policy to exert
pressure at often predictable junctures in the political process. These
junctures provide a means of influencing—and sometimes thwarting—
substantive policy proposals. Veto gates include, for example, committees and subcommittees, calendaring regimes, the filibuster, conference committees, and failing these, the executive veto.10 Although
veto gates allow groups potentially affected by legislation to negotiate
changes that reduce the potential negative impact of a bill, or even to
stop it, these same mechanisms provide opportunities for side payments unrelated to the bill’s substance.11
Madison proposed a difficult lawmaking process as the silver lining benefiting a minority class comprising the landed wealthy. And
yet, some have argued that he failed to fully envision the daunting
6 The following discussion relies upon congressional lawmaking processes, but for our
immediate purposes, the differences between federal and state legislative processes are minor.
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Mark G. Spencer, Hume and
Madison on Faction, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 869, 869–70, 884, 896 (2002) (comparing historical
figures’ treatment of factions).
8 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 7 (defining “veto gates” as the mechanisms by which legislators determine which branch of the decision tree the legislative process
will follow).
9 See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 385, 408 n.137 (1992) (defining “negative legislative checkpoints” as “the various loci at
which an individual legislator or a group of legislators representing minority interests can slow
down or stop a bill or, alternatively, at which minority interests can focus their lobbying efforts
to procure legislative benefits”). Although framed differently, the terms “veto gates” and “negative legislative check points” are virtually synonymous and will be used interchangeably
throughout.
10 Id. at 397–98; see also STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 255–56 (describing various
legislative hurdles fixed in the lawmaking process).
11 See Stearns, supra note 9, at 412–22 (distinguishing “substantive compromise,” which
affects the substance of legislation, and “length compromise,” which results in dead weight in the
form of riders). Scholars have observed that although the President answers to a national constituency, he remains subject to interest group pressures. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (1982).
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cloud of opportunities for special interest (read factional) influence.12
One claimed benefit of direct democracy is that it bypasses potential
interest group influence on legislators as compared with traditional
legislative processes.13 Direct democracy thus serves as an escape
valve that reduces interest group pressures to mitigate bolder legislation or to impose unrelated and costly riders. Of course this analysis
begs important normative questions, including how to determine appropriate interest group influence;14 how to delineate general versus
special interest legislation;15 and how the startup costs of direct democracy themselves invite their own special interest influence, with
the effect of encouraging often extreme changes in policy as compared, for example, to the ideal point of median legislators.16
B. Direct Democracy’s Defenders
Professor Elisabeth Gerber maintains that direct democracy empowers the electorate to improve policy alignment with majoritarian
preferences.17 Through direct democracy, and more specifically
through voter initiatives, Gerber claims, grassroots organizations can
circumvent entrenched political processes, which tend to afford traditional interest groups a comparative advantage in influencing policy.18
Gerber explains that, assessed against majority voter preferences, direct democracy improves policy alignment in two complementary
ways. First, assuming voters are adequately informed, and thus not
12 See generally Frank Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (1984).
13 See infra Part I.B (reviewing literature defending reliance on plebiscites on, among
other grounds, minimizing interest group pressures on legislatures).
14 See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48–59 (1991).
15 See Glen O. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403,
408–09 (1988) (distinguishing general and special interest legislation based upon relative cost
and benefit functions).
16 See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 952–55 (2005) (modeling incentives to
pursue plebiscites based upon the distance between expected legislative action and the ideal
point of the electoral median voter along relevant policy dimension). For a more detailed discussion of this model, see infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
17 See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 100–01 (1996).

See ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 10, 72–74 (1999) (explaining that, whereas grassroots organizations tend to use plebiscite processes to influence policy, economic interests tend
to use such processes to preserve the status quo).
18

AND THE
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confused about the substance of initiatives or referendums,19 direct
democracy effectuates preferred policy outcomes.20 Second, the mere
availability or threat of an initiative or referendum indirectly pressures legislatures to better align policy outcomes with median electoral preferences along isolated issue dimensions even when not used.21
Operating both positively—encouraging preferred policies—and
negatively—discouraging disfavored policies22—direct democracy exerts political pressure that tends to inhibit slack between the electorate as the principal, and state legislators as the agents.23 Scholars
maintain that direct democracy has improved policy alignment in
states that have it in such areas as the death penalty, parental consent
provisions for minors seeking abortions, access to same-sex marriage,
and decisions concerning which demographic groups to include within
employment discrimination laws.24
Professor Elizabeth Garrett maintains that disaggregating packaged policies into discrete choices improves policy alignment with median electoral preferences.25 Garrett explains that legislative
processes force electoral choices over candidates, who represent packaged issue bundles.26 Each voter supports or opposes a candidate
based upon whether the aggregate bundle is closer to the voter’s combined package of ideal points for salient issues, even if the candidate’s
ideal point for a particularly important issue or subset of issues within
19 Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness
in Direct Legislation Elections, 17 POL. BEHAV. 287, 288 (1995).
20 Gerber, supra note 17, at 100 (explaining that proponents argue that initiatives allow
voters to enact preferred policies directly). In general, if initiative or referendum voters represent a random cross section of registered or eligible voters, outcomes will closely correspond
with median electoral ideal points along relevant isolated policy dimensions. See supra text accompanying notes 19–28.
21 Gerber, supra note 17, at 101; see also JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE
FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84, 91 (2004).
22 This might help explain the disinclination of legislators to take public positions on initiatives. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence
Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1152 (2003) (noting that
“aggressive involvement” in direct democracy by politicians and major political parties is rare).
Part of the payoff of not resolving issues legislatively might include not only leaving issues to
direct democracy, but also avoiding public stands on those issues.
23 Gerber, supra note 17, at 124 (illustrating this phenomenon with parental consent laws).
24 ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 143–48, 195 (2000) (summarizing
studies); Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives 2, 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8036, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8036.
25 Garrett, supra note 2.
26 Perhaps more accurately, candidates represent a set of ideal points over disparate issues
coupled with some set of expectations as to negotiating effectiveness.
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the bundle is considerably distant from that of the voter.27 By disaggregating the issue bundle, direct democracy allows each voter to register preferences along discrete policy dimensions unencumbered by
the candidate’s—or the political party’s—preferred bundling.
Professor John Matsusaka has produced several leading empirical
studies of direct democracy. Matsusaka supports the intuition that in
those contexts typified by principal-agent slack, direct democracy better aligns policy with the ideal point of the electoral median voter than
does legislative policymaking,28 and shows consistent results respecting taxation and spending levels on various government programs.29
Direct democracy tends to encourage fee-based over tax-based provision of government largesse.30 If one assumes that ability and willingness to pay correlate to more highly valued public goods, this might
suggest that direct democracy promotes more cost-effective mechanisms for the provision of government services. Matsusaka has further shown that states with referendums are less prone to progressive,
or redistributive, tax-and-spend policies than states without direct democracy.31 In addition, overall taxing and spending levels, and salary
levels for executive officials, tend to be lower in initiative than noninitiative states.32
One interesting illustration of principal-agent slack involves term
limits. The Supreme Court has struck down state laws imposing term
limits on congressional delegations.33 With respect to state legislatures, where term limits are permitted, states with initiatives are far
more likely to have term limits than states without initiatives.34 The
data are striking. As Matsusaka observes, “22 of 24 initiative states
adopted term limits for their congressmen or state legislatures, compared to two of 26 noninitiative states.”35
27

Garrett, supra note 2.

28

MATSUSAKA, supra note 21, at 86, 130–31; see also Garrett, supra note 2, at 140.

29

MATSUSAKA, supra note 21, at 54–55.

30

John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 185, 195

& n.6.
31

Id. at 195.

Id. at 195–96. Matsusaka has shown similar correlations in Switzerland, where, he
claims, direct democracy tends to promote more cost-effective provision of government largesse.
See id. at 201 (summarizing studies).
32

33

See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837–38 (1995).

Matsusaka, supra note 30, at 195. The same is likely true for federal term limits, but the
Supreme Court invalidated state-enacted congressional term limits. Thornton, 514 U.S. at
837–38.
34

35

Matsusaka, supra note 30, at 195.
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Similar results apply in the context of laws restricting takings
powers. Professor Ilya Somin has found that, following the Supreme
Court’s controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New London,36 states
with initiative processes were more prone to enact effective laws limiting private development takings than states lacking initiatives,37
which, Somin maintains, generally enacted symbolic legislation.38
In separate but related works, Professors Lynn Baker39 and Clayton Gillette40 each refute arguments that, as compared with direct democracy, representative democracy systematically produces higher
quality drafting and policies that are more solicitous of minority concerns.41 Gillette claims that direct democracy is not especially prone
to agenda setting by interest groups,42 and that separating authorship
36 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
37 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2143–48 (2009) (discussing popular referendums that limited nonpublic
takings in response to Kelo).
38 Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More Democratic?, 55
DRAKE L. REV. 971, 982 n.50 (2007).
39 See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 709–10 (1991) [hereinafter Baker, Direct Democracy]; Lynn A.
Baker, Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 317, 317–19 (2004).
40 Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
609, 614 (1998) [hereinafter Gillette, Anti-Democratic]; Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 930–31 (1988)
[hereinafter Gillette, Plebiscites].
41 Baker bases her result on the Condorcet criterion, stating: “A logrolling process . . . will
also converge on a Condorcet choice because it is the only outcome that cannot be blocked by
any coalition of voters.” Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39, at 726. Gillette claims that the
combination of local initiatives and the power to “vote with your feet,” improves policy alignment with constituent preferences. That is because under specified conditions, individuals can
exert pressure, for example respecting taxation and spending policies, through threatened or
actual relocation. See Gillette, Anti-Democratic, supra note 40, at 628. For the classic presentation of the underlying theory, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416, 419–20 (1956), which demonstrates conditions under which voters can improve policy alignment by relocating from communities with disadvantageous policies and toward those with more favorable policies.
In fact, however, legislative processes do not ensure Condorcet-winning outcomes. Because
legislatures provide multiple venues at which interested constituencies and their representatives
can register preference intensities, legislatures often thwart potential Condorcet outcomes. See
infra text accompanying notes 48–64. And while the Tiebout mechanism potentially protects
minorities, this benefit is tempered to the extent that minorities have relatively scarce financial
resources and thus limited mobility. See Tiebout, supra, at 421–22. Moreover, as Gillette concedes, this mechanism has diminished force with respect to statewide plebiscites. See Gillette,
Anti-Democratic, supra note 40, at 628.
42 See Gillette, Anti-Democratic, supra note 40, at 624 (“My claim . . . is not that interest
groups will avoid initiatives. . . . Rather, my more modest claim is that there is little reason to
believe that the initiative is more susceptible to interest groups than is the legislature.”).
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from negotiating power does not produce inferior draftsmanship relative to legislatures, which merge these functions.43 Baker and Gillette
reject arguments that legislative veto gates, which serve as venues for
negotiating policy modifications, improve policy outcomes.44 Although Baker disagrees with Gillette’s claim that the benefits of logrolling and legislative compromise are overstated,45 both agree that
legislative processes are not systematically better at protecting minority concerns than direct democracy.46 Both maintain that there is no
structural reason to discredit direct democracy without also questioning the quality of legislative outcomes.47
43 See id. at 631–35. Gillette advanced the more “extreme claim, that deliberation is overvalued,” based upon historical examples of separating functions of drafting and debate and the
intuition that when these processes are separate, compromise is often reflected in the proposal
prior to formal submission. See id. This argument appears in tension with that of Professors
Kousser and McCubbins, who maintain that political entrepreneurs pursue initiatives only when
the expected value is high, as reflected in the policy distance between the electoral median voter
and the legislative median voter on the underlying policy question. See Kousser & McCubbins,
supra note 16, at 953–54.
44 For example, Professor Baker states:
To the extent that a given difference in the two lawmaking processes makes it more
difficult for a racial minority to block disadvantageous legislation in a plebiscitary
than in a representative process, that same difference will make it easier for the
minority to pass advantageous legislation in a plebiscitary than in a representative
process.
Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39, at 711; see also Gillette, Anti-Democratic, supra note
40, at 628 (supporting Baker’s conclusion that “a rational, self-interested minority would not
necessarily favor representative over direct democracy”). The claimed symmetry, however, appears overstated. Within legislatures, it is generally easier for minorities to block than pass,
whereas within plebiscites, it is easier for majorities to pass, yet more difficult for minorities to
block. See infra text accompanying note 54.
45 See Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39, at 725 (conceding that “legislatures provide more opportunities for logrolling than do plebiscites”); Gillette, Anti-Democratic, supra
note 40, at 623 (stating that “opportunities for logrolling likely are greater with representatives
than with the voters”).
46 See Gillette, Plebiscites, supra note 40, at 968–69 (observing that voter turnout to a
limited extent reflects intensities of preference).
47 See Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39, at 757; Gillette, Plebiscites, supra note 40,
at 978. Finally, some defenders of direct democracy maintain that dispersed voter inputs improve initiative or referendum quality of outcomes consistent with the Condorcet Jury Theorem
(“CJT”) or the wisdom of crowds. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 129 (2003)
(illustrating CJT with a hypothetical national referendum on drug legalization). For a discussion
of the CJT and its underlying assumptions, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 430–31,
and JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 10 (2004), which identify the following as
necessary conditions for the wisdom of the crowds: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation. To the extent that initiatives or referendums resolve issues for
which a broad pool of separately generated inputs improves the accuracy of outcomes, direct
democracy might strengthen the quality of inputs relative to ordinary legislative processes (unless individual legislators receive adequate separate constituent inputs). Even so, questions of
public policy rarely admit of a right or wrong answer as required for the CJT to apply.
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C. Direct Democracy’s Detractors
Critics of direct democracy question each of the preceding arguments on normative or methodological grounds. While also offering
arguments in support of direct democracy,48 Garrett acknowledges
that direct democracy only better aligns policy with median voter preferences assuming sufficient voter turnout to represent a meaningful
cross section of the general electorate.49 Otherwise, direct democracy
risks a skewed depiction of median voter preferences.50
Among the most interesting empirical questions concerning direct democracy is the expected influence of various forms of initiatives
on the level and representativeness of voter turnout. Professors Thad
Kousser and Mathew McCubbins explain that what they term cryptoinitiatives distort turnout representativeness.51 These initiatives are
designed to affect turnout respecting some other balloted matter—for
example, candidate election—by motivating potentially disaffected
constituencies to vote even though few expect the initiative to pass.52
Conversely, wedge issues divide otherwise generally aligned voters,
with a similar but less predictable distorting effect on turnout.53
Another group of scholars posit systematic biases not directly
linked to voter turnout. In separate works, the late Professors Julian
Eule and Derrick Bell posit that direct democracy operates to the detriment of demographic minorities, including most notably, African
Americans and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
(“LGBT”) community.54 The intuition is fairly straightforward: because minority voters are, almost by definition, outnumbered within
state and municipal electorates, the risk of adverse outcomes pervades
initiative and referendum processes. These authors claim that direct
democracy is inherently problematic for minority interests because
unlike legislatures, which have mechanisms that facilitate compromise, direct democracy presents the electorate with a binary choice.
Direct democracy forces decisionmaking on more ambitious policy
proposals than those that would survive in a legislative setting.
See generally Garrett, supra note 2.
See id. at 140.
50 See id. at 141.
51 See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 975.
52 See id. at 974.
53 See id. at 976–77.
54 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1978); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1552–53 (1990).
48
49
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Dean Erwin Chemerinsky focuses specifically on the absence of
legislative filters to argue that direct democracy might run afoul of the
constitutional guarantee to every state of a republican form of government.55 Chemerinsky maintains that, historically, the Framers did not
anticipate direct democracy, and instead insisted upon filters between
voter preferences and enacted legal policies. Specifically, the Framers
intended a system of government, embodied in the U.S. Constitution,
that balanced concern for minorities with majority rule.56 Although
the particular minority about which the Framers were principally concerned was the landed wealthy,57 Chemerinsky nonetheless maintains
that “[they] saw direct democracy as the antithesis of a republican
form of government.”58
Most notably for the social choice analysis that follows, Kousser
and McCubbins maintain that political entrepreneurs will generally
pursue plebiscites with relatively extreme payoffs as compared with
expected legislative action.59 The authors compare strategies tracking
the expected value of the median legislator, equal to the floor median
voter (F), versus the median electoral voter (i), on the issue under
review. As the authors show in the first graphic—reproduced in Figure 1 below60—where F is relatively closer than i to the status quo
(SQ), but moves policy in the preferred direction, political entrepreneurs will assess whether to pursue lobbying or an initiative depending on the distance between F and i.61 In the second graphic—also
reproduced in Figure 1—where F is on the opposite side of SQ as
compared with i, the authors posit that political entrepreneurs will
have a stronger motivation to push an initiative because expected legislative action would move policy opposite their preferred direction.

55

Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293,

301–03.
56

See id. at 295.

57

See id. at 296 (observing that “the Framers weren’t concerned about racial minorities”).

58

See id. at 301.

59

See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 956–57.

60

The graphics in Figure 1 are taken from Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 952–53

61

Id. at 953–54.

fig.2.
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Figure 1. Issue Placement and Relationship to Legislative or
Plebiscite Process
Placement of Policy if Legislature Acts
Issue k
i

F

SQ

Initiative Sponsor Will Not Lobby Legislature
Issue k
F

SQ

i

The authors note that given the high startup costs of balloting
initiatives, which include securing the requisite number of signatures
according to varying state law requirements,62 initiative sponsors will
invest the necessary capital only if doing so is likely to produce a significant and favorable policy change from the status quo.63 Kousser
and McCubbins conclude that political entrepreneurs will be motivated to seek initiatives only when the value of doing so, represented
by the difference between F and i, is relatively extreme.64
Kousser and McCubbins pose another theoretical objection to
claims that initiatives track median electoral policy preferences. The
authors assert that voter preferences over initiatives can cycle, with
the result that multiple initiative outcomes not only miss available
Condorcet winners,65 but also generate Condorcet losers, meaning an
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS FOR INPROPOSALS: 2010 ELECTIONS (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/elect/2010_Sig_Reqs.pdf (detailing, state-by-state, the signature requirements for ballot
initiatives).
62

ITIATIVE

63 Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 953–54. The bill sponsor will receive secondary benefits including base mobilization at the stage of securing signatures and publicity attendant the balloting (both pro and con), in addition to possible success in securing passage. Cf.
Daniel A. Smith & Caroline J. Tolbert, The Initiative to Party: Partisanship and Ballot Initiatives
in California, 7 PARTY POL. 739, 741 (2001) (noting that a political party might support initiatives
that will increase base turnout and that will serve as a wedge issue against an opposing party,
provided the substance is ideologically compatible with the party platform).
64 See infra text accompanying notes 73–76. As this Article demonstrates, extending the
logic of this model, it is possible that when voters anticipate limited proposals on the subject
matter under review, and when the initiative goes further in changing policy relative to the median voter’s ideal point, the median voter might support the initiative if it is closer to his or her
ideal point than either the status quo or the expected value of legislative action.
65 Condorcet winners are options that, absent a first-choice majority candidate, defeat all
others in binary comparisons. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1253 (1994).
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option universally regarded as inferior to an available alternative.66
This result might obtain, for example, if the process allows the voters
to sequentially approve spending projects in periods one and two and
then to retrench on the necessary funding to support those projects in
period three. The combined result—approved projects without adequate funding—is one that all voters would consider inferior to either
(1) approving and funding, or (2) rejecting and failing to fund, were
the issues taken up simultaneously.67
Other commentators claim that direct democracy risks problematic outcomes reflecting voter ignorance or confusion.68 Such claims
are difficult to quantify, but there is some anecdotal evidence.69 In his
landmark article on direct democracy, Eule describes moving in the
1970s from the East Coast to Los Angeles to join the faculty of the
UCLA School of Law, and receiving advice from friends and colleagues about managing the cultural and financial transition.70 Although he reported taking the “earthquakes, orange-tinted hair, and
mortgages resembling the national budget deficit” in stride, he noted a
surprising exception: the enormous mailings before each election cycle, which contained the various initiatives and referendums that
would appear on the upcoming ballot.71 Eule described wading
through the morass of the competing Propositions 100, 101, 103 and
104, each dealing with insurance reform, and his sincere, but ultimately failed, attempt to make sense of it.72 He questioned how, if a
66 Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 964. For an argument that, even if they do not
reflect cycling, the outcomes of initiatives are problematic because they reflect the will of a
“random majority,” see Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy
and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 702 & n.67 (2010), which posits that seemingly cyclical popular democratic outcomes might reflect changing voter preferences over time.
67

For a more detailed discussion and analysis, see infra notes 227–31 and accompanying

text.
68 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 297–99 (arguing that, because initiatives are
frequently poorly drafted and initiative campaigns are often deceptive, voters often decide on
measures they do not fully understand); Eule, supra note 54, at 1508–09 (describing personal
confusion and frustration with California initiative campaigns).
69 For an account claiming that voters rely on third-party endorsements as proxies, see
Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California
Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 69–72 (1994). At a minimum, voter
reliance on endorsements to support or oppose plebiscites, as opposed to independent assessments, undermines CJT-based justifications for direct democracy. See generally sources cited
supra note 47 (explaining CJT-based justifications for direct democracy).
70

See Eule, supra note 54, at 1508.

71

Id. at 1508–09.

See id. at 1569 (“If among the nine million voters there were some who purported to
understand the pros and cons of the various measures, I was not one of them.”).
72
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tenured law professor could not sort this all out, those with less legal
training could manage.73
II.

A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS

OF

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The preceding literature review demonstrates sharp disagreements concerning the wisdom and efficacy of direct democracy on
normative, empirical, and methodological grounds. And yet, these
scholarly works provide the beginnings of a somewhat coherent sketch
of the benefits and burdens of direct democracy, at least as compared
with representative democracy. The scholarship suggests that not all
subject areas are equally well suited to resolution through direct
democracy.74
In general, direct democracy potentially reduces or inhibits slack
between legislators and constituents taking the following forms: fiscal
irresponsibility, limits on electoral competition, or cost dispersion
through general taxation-based—rather than fee-based—funding.75
Direct democracy correlates with streamlined and more accountable
government, including limited state legislative terms.76
Conversely, direct democracy risks producing outcomes that reflect agenda setting and embedded cycles,77 outcomes that are the
product of voter misinformation or ballot confusion,78 and outcomes
that reflect indifference to the concerns of those most adversely affected by particular plebiscites, including, most notably, demographic
minorities.79 In addition, direct democracy risks distorting electoral
turnout affecting other matters through such devices as crypto-initiatives and wedge initiatives.80 More generally, when voting is not
meaningfully representative, direct democracy risks producing outcomes that might not reflect median electoral preferences.81 Finally,
direct democracy risks generating extreme policies when political entrepreneurs strategically locate initiative policies anticipating limited
opportunities for electoral reconsideration.82
See id. at 1509.
See infra Part III.
75 See John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE
149, 149–52 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrick Schneider eds., 2004).
76 See id.
77 Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 966–67.
78 See Eule, supra note 54, at 1508.
79 See Bell, supra note 54, at 1; Eule, supra note 54, at 1551–52.
80 See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 974–75.
81 See Garrett, supra note 2.
82 See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 956–57.
73
74
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Although direct democracy’s supporters and detractors appreciate the potential for distorting effects resulting from voter misinformation, differential turnout, and cycling preferences, they disagree as
to how often these difficulties arise and even on how to test for it.83
Holding these problems aside, supporters and detractors also disagree
on the normative merit of aligning policy with the ideal point of the
median electoral voter along discrete issue dimensions. Supporters
claim that satisfying majority preferences along isolated issue dimensions improves public policy.84 Opponents rejoin that the filtering
processes of representative government improve legislative outputs
even when legislation fails to vindicate majoritarian preferences registered along isolated policy dimensions.85 The social choice analysis
developed below helps to assess these competing claims.
The following analysis endorses neither broad adoption nor elimination of direct democracy. Social choice, first and foremost, reveals
inherent imperfections in all collective decisionmaking institutions.
This includes legislatures, appellate judicial tribunals, and direct democracy. But not all imperfections are the same, and social choice is
particularly well suited to identifying and comparing relative institutional strengths and weaknesses.86 Social choice analysis provides a
common set of analytical benchmarks against which all institutions
can be compared, and against which all institutions will necessarily
come up short in some respect. Given the inevitable differences
across institutions, we cannot answer whether legislatures, courts, or
direct democracy are good or bad as an a priori matter. The answer
will depend on the specific tasks assigned to each institution.
Remember also that virtually all jurisdictions with direct democracy use it to complement, not to replace, legislative lawmaking.87 The
critical comparison is not between a regime in which all public policy
decisions are made by direct democracy and a regime in which none
are. Instead the issue is whether a mixed regime—one that uses the
See supra Part I.
See Gerber, supra note 17, at 100.
85 See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 296; Eule, supra note 54, at 1556–57.
86 For a discussion framed in terms of the nirvana fallacy, see generally STEARNS &
ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 112, which notes that “[s]cholars commit the nirvana fallacy when they
identify a defect in a given institution and then, based upon the perceived defect, propose fixing
the problem by shifting decisional responsibility somewhere else.” See also Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
87 Matsusaka, for example, notes that while Buchanan and Tullock claim that direct democracy creates high decision costs as a means of limiting external costs, the authors only consider direct democracy as displacing representative democracy. See Matsusaka, supra note 75, at
149–50; see also STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 548.
83
84
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legislature as the presumptive source of policymaking and that occasionally allows either substitute policymaking via voter initiative or
that allows a check against legislation in the form of legislative referendums—is better or worse over particular matters than a regime that
only permits legislative policymaking.88 The answer to this question
need not be the same for all policy matters.89 As shown below, determining how best to calibrate policymaking between these institutions
requires a three-way comparison that also includes appellate judicial
decisionmaking.
The justification for comparing direct democracy to representative legislatures is obvious. Absent direct democracy, the presumptive, or default, position at both the state and local levels is that public
policy is enacted by some form of popularly elected legislative body.90
Although there are important differences between local, state, and
federal legislative bodies, and indeed among various local and state
legislatures, there are nonetheless sufficient similarities to allow for
meaningful general comparisons.
The justification for comparing direct democracy to appellate judicial tribunals is less obvious. Even strong advocates of a public interest model of adjudication do not generally claim that, absent direct
democracy, the judiciary should be empowered in the first instance to
make public policy.91 This institutional comparison remains important, however, for two reasons. First, although courts do not hold legislative primacy within the United States and many other
constitutional democracies, they pass judgment on the permissibility,
or constitutionality, of positive law, whether enacted via legislation or
plebiscite. Second, because most legal scholars reject judicial primacy
in policymaking,92 it is important to identify those features of judicial
decisionmaking processes that appear problematic in assigning the judiciary primary policymaking responsibility. This is especially important to the extent that appellate judicial decisionmaking processes
bear features that operate in parallel fashion to either direct democracy or legislative decisionmaking. The social choice analysis demonstrates that in several critical respects, direct democracy more closely
resembles appellate judicial decisionmaking than legislative decisionSee Matsusaka, supra note 75, at 150.
Id.
90 Id. at 149.
91 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1481 (1987) (reconciling dynamic statutory interpretation with the claim that “the legislature is the primary lawmaking body”).
92 See id. (noting that the legislature is the primary lawmaking body).
88
89
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making. This proves both a strength and weakness of direct democracy. The three-way institutional comparison provides the basis for
closer consideration of the capacity of direct democracy to further, or
undermine, important democratic lawmaking norms.93
Evaluating relative institutional competence in transforming preferences into outcomes is ultimately a problem of social choice. To see
why, we need to turn to first principles.
A. An Introduction to Social Choice
The problem of social choice begins with the simple observation
that when individuals combine preferences to generate outputs, things
sometimes get unexpectedly complicated.94 For many people, “fair”
group decisionmaking implies a process in which all votes are given
equal weight and in which outcomes are not distorted through various
manipulative strategies.95 In effect, a fair process is one in which the
outcome—reflecting the majority preferences of group members—is
independent of the process itself in the sense that some other reasonable or fair process would generate the same, or a substantially similar,
outcome. One of the major contributions of social choice, however, is
demonstrating that as both a theoretical and practical matter, an institutional outcome is almost invariably a function of the decisionmaking
process that generates it.96 Therefore, this intuitive sense of fairness,
one that decouples outcomes from generative processes, is elusive.
Instead, the manner in which the decisionmaking rules process group
preferences typically affects—or using an economist’s lingo, is endogenous to—substantive outputs.
Social choice studies how the structure of decisionmaking
processes affects outcomes.97 Consider two groups of three deci93 Although this analysis has valence for various formal theories of democracy, including
deliberative democracy, pluralism, and republicanism, developing a formal democratic theory is
beyond the scope of this Article. For an informative introduction to the general literature on
theories of democracy, see FRANK CUNNINGHAM, THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2002). The theory of “direct (anti-)democracy” advanced in this Article fits comfortably with many, and perhaps most, extant theories of democracy, including deliberative,
pluralist, and most obviously social choice accounts. One theory that potentially might not fit
comfortably with this view is republicanism, at least to the extent that republican theory anticipates carving out discrete issues for majoritarian resolution, with limited opportunities for adversely affected minorities to express intensity of interest or to negotiate reciprocal gains in an
overall policy package.
94 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 93.
95 See id. at 94–95 (discussing the impact of voting method on ultimate result and the
impact of intensity of preference in influencing outcomes).
96 See id. at 93–94.
97 For a more thorough presentation of the social choice principles that are briefly ex-
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sionmakers, both of which lack a first-choice majority candidate over
available options, A, B, and C. The group members rank the options
as follows: P1: ABC; P2: BCA (or BAC); P3: CBA. Even though there
is no first-choice majority candidate, it is possible to generate an outcome that honors each member’s preferences and that aligns with
common intuitions concerning majority rule. Because there is no firstchoice majority winner, the members might consider a series of binary
comparisons—that is, successive votes between two of the three options—in the hope of discovering a stable outcome. In this regime,
option B defeats both A and C, with P2 and P3 preferring B to A, and
P1 and P2 preferring B to C. The choice between A and C is irrelevant; B defeats each alternative.98 In 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet
proposed that absent a first-choice majority candidate, the option that
defeats all others in direct comparisons should prevail.99 This option
is now known as a Condorcet winner, and rules that ensure that available Condorcet winners prevail are said to satisfy the Condorcet
criterion.100
The Condorcet criterion appeals to fairness intuitions because
when it is satisfied no outcome will emerge that a majority disfavors
relative to an available alternative. Despite this, rules satisfying the
Condorcet criterion suffer two important defects. First, although the
prior example included a Condorcet-winning option, this does not
hold for all nonmajority preference combinations. Consider an alternative set of preferences: P1: ABC, P2: BCA, P3: CAB, where only the
second and third ordinally ranked preferences of P3 are changed. This
time, the same voting protocol reveals separate majorities favoring A
to B (P1 and P3 prevailing) and C to A (P2 and P3 prevailing), but also
B to C (P1 and P2 prevailing). The result is a cycle subject to the
designation: ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by simple majority vote. Second, the Condorcet criterion only accounts for ordinally
ranked preferences. It does not account for the intensity with which
individuals hold those preferences. In the first example, although option B is the Condorcet winner, other considerations might render
plored in the following paragraph, see id. at 93–107. See also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 41–52
(2000) (containing a slightly more technical discussion of the same topic).
98 This explains why the same outcome obtains whether P2 ranks the options BCA or
BAC.
99 See Stearns, supra note 65, at 1221, 1252–54 (explaining and illustrating the Condorcet
criterion).
100 See id. at 1252–53, 1255; see also STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 103, 129–31
(discussing the evolution of rule systems to make Condorcet winners more likely).
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that outcome problematic. If, for example, P1 significantly prefers A
to B and slightly prefers B to C, whereas P2 and P3 do not much care
about this issue but would rank the options as indicated if asked, then
A might be socially preferred to B even though B is a Condorcet
winner.
The Condorcet criterion is grounded in the majoritarian norm,
and, not surprisingly, it shares the defects of majoritarianism. Just as
there is not always a majority candidate, so too there is not always a
Condorcet winner. And just as majority rule does not consider
strength of preference, the Condorcet criterion does not either. This
comparison is important because implicit in many arguments for direct democracy is the assumption that majoritarian outcomes are normatively preferred, whether they reflect first-choice electoral
majorities or implicit majorities (meaning Condorcet winners) that represent a median electoral position on a given issue dimension. And
yet, the normative merit of majoritarian outcomes, like outcomes
under alternative decisionmaking rules, are affected by the strengths
and weaknesses of the rule itself. The merits of majoritarianism as
applied to isolated questions of public policy taken up by direct democracy must therefore be defended, not merely assumed.
The problem of cycling preferences lies at the root of what might
well be the most important modern insight of social choice, namely
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, or simply Arrow’s theorem.101 In an
important respect, Arrow’s theorem generalizes what is commonly described as the paradox of voting.102 The paradox holds that even when
individuals hold transitive preference orderings, under some circumstances, for example the second illustration above (P1: ABC; P2: BCA;
P3: CAB), aggregating the preferences through a regime of unlimited
binary comparisons yields a cycle (ApBpCpA). Professor Kenneth
Arrow’s generalization proves that any “solution” to cycling, meaning
any institutional rule that ensures a transitive outcome when process-

101 For a general discussion of the concepts that follow, see STEARNS, supra note 97, at
41–94; Maxwell L. Stearns, An Introduction to Social Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 88, 88 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010);
Stearns, supra note 65, at 1247–52. For a discussion of the relationships between the criteria
described in the text following Professor William Vickrey’s simplified proof and Arrow’s articulated criteria, see STEARNS, supra note 97, at 327 n.22, 334–35, 336 n.104, 337 n.112. See also
William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507, 507–35 (1960).

See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETHEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 116 (1982) (claiming Arrow’s theorem “generaliz[es] the paradox of voting”).
102

TWEEN THE
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ing such preferences, necessarily undermines a feature of institutional
design associated with fair collective decisionmaking.
Arrow’s theorem proves that no institution can ensure the ability
to transform member preferences into a rational, or transitive group
ordering (meaning A preferred to B preferred to C implies A preferred to C), while also satisfying the following four fairness conditions103: (1) Range: the collective decisionmaking rule must select its
outcome in a manner that is consistent with the members’ selection
from among all conceivable ordinal rankings over three available alternatives; (2) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: participants
must choose between paired alternatives based solely upon the merits
and without regard to how they would rank later-introduced options;
(3) Unanimity: the institution must implement changes from the status
quo to an alternate state that will improve the position of at least a
single participant without harming anyone else (the Pareto criterion);
and (4) Nondictatorship: the group cannot consistently vindicate the
preferences of one member against the contrary will of the group as a
whole.
Before parsing Arrow’s conditions, it is worth considering their
broader relationship. Arrow set out to design an institution that
would satisfy a set of criteria that he regarded as essential to rationality (meaning capable of transforming transitive member preferences
into transitive group orderings) and fairness (meaning founded in
democratic norms).104 Instead, Arrow proved axiomatically the impossibility of that very task.105 Arrow demonstrated that any collective decisionmaking body that ensures transitive group orderings will
necessarily relax at least one fairness condition.106 Because Arrow’s
theorem is axiomatic, it implies the following corollary: any institution
that satisfies the most basic condition of transforming member preferences into some form of collective output necessarily relaxes at least
one, and possibly more than one, of the combined criteria of rationality plus the four fairness conditions.107
This corollary is essential to the comparative institutional analysis
that follows. By treating Arrow’s combined conditions as a template
against which to compare two (or more) collective decisionmaking
See sources cited supra note 101.
See Stearns, supra note 101, at 92.
105 See id.
106 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 81; Stearns, supra note 101, at 117–18; Stearns, supra
note 65, at 1252.
107 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 83; Stearns, supra note 101, at 118.
103
104
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bodies, we can discern which Arrovian condition(s) each institution
adheres to or relaxes. For virtually every collective decisionmaking
body, the analysis will necessarily reveal some important characteristic
feature, or Arrovian deficiency, and this will vary in important ways
across institutions. By way of illustration, whereas some commentators maintain that direct democracy and representative democracy are
both subject to interest group influence, defects in draftsmanship, and
outcomes that operate to the detriment of minorities,108 social choice
analysis provides a basis for going beyond such generalizations by
identifying the differing mechanisms of interest group influence, how
the quality of draftsmanship might vary, and how minorities are likely
to fare in each institutional setting given the structural differences.
One might argue that there is no obvious reason to assume that
each of Arrow’s conditions is essential in any given decisionmaking
body and that reliance on the theorem as a comparative template is
therefore misguided. Prominent scholars writing from a range of disciplines have argued against the importance of such conditions as rationality (transitivity),109 or Independence.110 Resolving these
normative debates is not necessary to the analysis that follows. The
following analysis is not merely consistent with, but is dependent on,
what we can describe as the overriding metalevel claim in this literature, namely that particular Arrovian conditions might prove inessential to the functioning of some—and maybe even all—institutions.
To see why, remember Arrow’s project. Arrow sought to develop
a single institution capable of transforming individually transitive
preference orderings into rational outputs for the institution as a
whole while also satisfying conditions he deemed essential to democratic decisionmaking.111 Although Arrow proved that project impossible, it is important to recognize that Arrow did not set out to identify
which of his specified conditions were more, or less, important in any
given institution.112 Because any functioning institution necessarily relaxes at least one Arrovian condition, it is inevitable that any given
condition might prove inessential to the functioning of the institution
See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2147–58, 2192 (1990)
(impugning collective rationality or transitivity).
110 See RIKER, supra note 102, at 129–30 (challenging Arrovian Independence); see also
DONALD G. SAARI, DISPOSING DICTATORS, DEMYSTIFYING VOTING PARADOXES: SOCIAL
CHOICE ANALYSIS 45 (2008) (positing that Independence vitiates individual transitivity).
111 See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 109, at 2131–36.
112 See id.
108
109
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in which it is relaxed.113 This holds even if honoring the same condition is a defining characteristic of another institution. Arrow’s theorem provides the basis for meaningful institutional comparisons based
upon identified criteria that are, or are not, important to each institution. This method unmasks each institution’s comparative social
choice profile, meaning its dominant features of institutional design.
B. A Three-Way Comparative Social Choice Analysis
The analysis begins with a comparison of appellate courts to legislatures. After defining which features of collective decisionmaking,
based upon the conditions of Arrow’s theorem, each institution relaxes, we can then compare the social choice profiles of these two institutions to that of direct democracy. Beginning with legislatures and
courts, rather than with direct democracy, allows us to set up the analytical endpoints or paradigms for the eventual three-way institutional
comparison.
1. A Comparative Analysis of Legislatures and Appellate Courts
The critical difference between appellate courts and legislatures
from a social choice perspective involves two fairness criteria, Independence and Range,114 although the analysis also has implications for
the remaining conditions, Unanimity and Nondictatorship. As a general matter, legislatures relax Independence (which approximates
principled decisionmaking), while adhering to Range (which approximates permitting indecision, or inertia, when group preferences
cycle).115
Relaxing Independence is sometimes, but not always, the means
through which legislatures achieve Unanimity, meaning mutually beneficial vote trades that leave at least one member better off without
harming other members.116 By contrast, appellate courts generally relax Range (thus ensuring outcomes even when judicial preferences
over underlying issues and outcomes are intransitive, or cycle), while
adhering to Independence (thus limiting opportunities for various
forms of strategic decisionmaking when deciding cases).117
113

See id.

114

Stearns, supra note 65, at 1247.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.
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Generally speaking, appellate judges do not trade votes, either
within or across cases, to improve member payoffs.118 This implies
that judicial decisionmaking tends not to promote mutually beneficial
trades that facilitate Unanimity. Neither legislatures nor appellate
tribunals violate Nondictatorship despite substantial power differentials among members that affect the quality of outputs and the ability
of minority interests to protect themselves in group decisionmaking.
We now unpack this summary to offer a more detailed social choice
profile of legislatures and appellate courts.
a. The Social Choice Profile of Legislatures: Relaxing
Independence, Adhering to Range
We begin with the two most significant Arrovian conditions for
comparing legislatures and appellate courts. Independence holds that
in choosing between paired alternatives, participants must decide
solely based upon the merits and without regard to how they would
rank options that might be introduced later.119 This implies that the
choice between options A and B must not be affected by the possible
later introduction of C. If the decision between A and B is strictly
merits-based, the later decision to introduce or withhold C has no
bearing.
A central insight of social choice is that outcomes are often dependent on the path, or order, of voting. With the following cycling
preferences, ABC, BCA, CAB, a regime permitting two binary comparisons can yield any outcome if the first contest eliminates the option capable of defeating a preferred candidate.120 For example, if the
agenda setter wants to achieve outcome C, then by pitting A versus B
initially, with the result that A wins, C will prevail over A in the next
round. Assuming a rule prohibiting reconsideration of defeated alternatives,121 the elimination of B in round one prevents the formal discovery of a cycle in which BpApCpB. And yet, strategic voting can
avoid this outcome or any other that might follow a specified voting
118 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 303–04 (1994) (describing
Justice Powell’s rejection of Justice Brennan’s overture to accommodate different views on de
facto/de jure distinction and busing in effort to garner majority support in Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), as “characteristic” of Powell’s disinterest in “making deals”); Anthony
D’Amato, Judicial Legislation, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 63, 65 (1979) (“[A] judge who traded votes
with his brethren from one case to another would properly be subject to censure.”). Other
Justices have sometimes more willingly accommodated other jurists to garner majority support
within specific cases. For a general discussion, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
119 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 88–92.
120 See id. at 121–22.
121 See id. at 70.
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path. If P1, who least prefers C, anticipates the preceding agenda
favoring C, then she might strategically vote for B in the first round
knowing that after B defeats A, B will then defeat the remaining option, C.
Opportunities for strategic voting are not limited to cycling. Condorcet winners are not always socially optimal, and strategic voting
sometimes allows their defeat. Assume the following modified preferences: P1: ABC; P2: BCA; P3: CBA. As previously shown,122 although
B is a Condorcet winner, B might nonetheless be an inferior social
choice if strength of preference is considered. Assuming that P3 cares
more deeply than the others about this issue, then if B versus A is
presented first, P3 might vote for A, knowing that with B defeated, C
would prevail over A in the next round.
A defining feature of legislative decisionmaking is that strategic
voting and vote trading—relaxing Arrow’s Independence criterion—
defend against agenda setting and occasionally thwart Condorcet winners.123 Within legislative markets, member effectiveness often depends on careful attention to agendas and voting strategies, with
members sometimes voting strategically and avoiding outcomes that
would follow from strict merits-based comparisons. Legislative veto
gates, or negative legislative checkpoints,124 provide focal points at
which those concerned about the direction of the proposed bill can
exert pressure to change language or adverse voting paths, or vote
strategically to otherwise thwart a disadvantageous result. These junctures make it easier to block than to pass legislation because success at
every focal point is required for passage whereas failing at only one is
sufficient for defeat.125 For this reason, effective threats to derail a
planned voting path—for example, through strategic voting—are potentially effective in avoiding adverse outcomes and in securing reciprocal commitments, thus allowing members to register cardinal, or
weighted, preferences.
Logrolling also allows members to transform ordinal into
weighted preferences. Through logrolling, members agree to support
each other’s preferred legislation to improve mutual prospects for pasSee supra text accompanying notes 94–100.
For a contrary position, see Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39, at 726–27 (arguing
that legislative processes favor Condorcet winners).
124 See supra notes 8–9.
125 This asymmetry implies that interest groups, including demographic minorities, can
more easily block than pass within legislatures. But see Baker, Direct Democracy, supra note 39,
at 711, 726 (arguing that symmetry exists in blocking and passing legislation within both direct
democracy and legislation).
122
123
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sage when, separately considered, each member would oppose the
other’s preferred bill and support only his or her own. Numerical minorities supporting separate bills, or items within bills, who feel intensely about passage can, through mutual exchange, form successful
majorities over larger legislative packages. Logrolling often produces
special interest items, or riders, that would fail to garner majority support on their own.
Vote trading facilitates legislative Unanimity. As in private markets, Arrow assumed that when individuals engage in mutual exchange, at least one member benefits and the other is not harmed.126
Otherwise they would not have bothered. Resolving scholarly debates over whether logrolling is welfare enhancing is unimportant for
our purposes.127 The issue here is not whether legislative logrolling
improves welfare for society; it is instead whether logrolling improves
the welfare of legislators. Of course, legislators would not roll logs if
they did not anticipate a benefit from doing so. Within legislatures,
relaxing Independence thus promotes Unanimity.
The other defining legislative characteristic involves Range.
Range requires that the collective decisionmaking rule select its outcome in a manner that is consistent with the members’ selection from
among all conceivable ordinal rankings over three available alternatives.128 This somewhat complex framing becomes more intuitive
when we divide Range into its constituent parts. First, each member
must be permitted to select from among all conceivable rank orderings over three available alternatives. Second, the processing rule
must honor—meaning it must operate consistently with—those rankings when producing a group outcome. Now consider the difficulty
that these two requirements pose.
Assume the following preferences, which yield B as a Condorcet
winner: P1: ABC; P2: BCA; P3: CBA. In this case each member has
issued ordinal rankings over three options, ABC. A decision rule that
ensures an outcome consistent with all possible ordinal rankings will
satisfy Condorcet’s rule, thus ensuring that an available Condorcet
STEARNS, supra note 97, at 49.
Compare JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 145
(1962) (arguing that legislative bargaining can be mutually beneficial), and Gordon Tullock, Why
So Much Stability?, 37 PUB. CHOICE 189, 190 (1981) (positing that vote trading can eliminate
legislative cycling), with William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1235, 1236 (1973) (arguing that, although vote trading improves the position
of the trader, it often generates significant costs for nontraders). See also STEARNS & ZYWICKI,
supra note 4, at 26–28 (detailing the pros and cons of legislative logrolling).
128 STEARNS, supra note 97, at 45, 49.
126
127
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winner will be selected. Each rule satisfying Condorcet’s condition
shares the essential feature of permitting at least the same number of
binary comparisons as options.129 With three options, the decisionmaking body requires a minimum of three binary comparisons (A versus B, B versus C, and C versus A) to determine whether the selected
outcome is a Condorcet winner or is instead the arbitrary product of a
voting path. In this example, B, the Condorcet winner, defeats A and
C in direct comparisons, rendering a final binary choice between A
and C irrelevant because B will defeat whichever option prevails.
Now consider preferences that cycle: P1: ABC; P2 BCA; P3: CAB.
Once again, the members have selected their preferred ordinal rankings over options ABC, but this time applying a decision rule that ensures consistency with each member’s ordinal ranking produces a
cycle such that ApBpCpA. No outcome honors each member’s selected rankings and therefore to ensure an outcome, the decision rule
must relax Range. When the members hold ordinally ranked preferences that cycle, a rule adhering to Range will not ensure an outcome
because any proposed outcome will violate the ordinal rankings of
some majority as compared with an available alternative.
We can formalize this intuition as follows: For options ABC,
there are six possible ordinal rankings. This can be expressed mathematically as three factorial (3 x 2 x 1), meaning that, for the first option, there are three choices, for the second there are two, and there is
no choice for the third. The possible rankings are: ABC, ACB, BAC,
BCA, CAB, CBA. When the members select among those six sets of
rankings, two packaged combinations produce a forward cycle—ABC,
BCA, CAB—and a reverse cycle—CBA, BAC, ACB—respectively.
Because Range-complying rules permit the same number of binary choices as options, such rules risk inaction in the event that members’ combined sets of ordinal rankings cycle (ABC, BCA, CAB or
CBA, BAC, ACB). The legislature has the wherewithal to recognize a
cycle (or less formally to recognize the absence of majority support for
proposed action on A, B, or C), and thus to decline to act on pairwise
votes that might inevitably lead to selecting a nonmajority option. Because scholars have identified institutional mechanisms within Congress that limit consideration of all available alternatives, this result
requires some explanation.
Social choice theorists, including William Riker, Steven Brams,
Kenneth Shepsle, and Barry Weingast, have identified features of
129

See id. at 47.
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rules within the United States Congress that raise the cost of discovering cyclical preferences and that induce equilibrium outcomes even
when preferences cycle. Riker and Brams focus on formal decision
rules that limit permissible amendments relative to available options.130 Shepsle and Weingast consider features, including committee
structures, calendaring rules, and the like, that have a similar effects.131 Rules that limit permissible iterations relative to available options promote stable outcomes, but those outcomes will depend on the
agenda.132 The preceding analysis, however, suggests that legislatures
have the wherewithal to identify cycles and the power to remain inert
when they arise. Although legislative practices that raise the cost of
disclosing cycling preferences appear in tension with the claim that
legislators can avoid acting on cycling preferences, the two claims can
be reconciled. That is because disclosures of preference need not occur through formal voting processes.
Although veto gates, rules limiting amendments, and other structure-induced equilibrating rules formally limit disclosure of all binary
comparisons over alternatives, behind these formal rules are the often
more important norms that permit informal disclosures, thus informing choices and strategies at the various veto gates. Legislators have
an incentive to discern preferences, through formal and informal
means, especially in high-stakes matters. By discovering member
preferences informally—based either on disclosed ordinal rankings or
on expressions of cardinal values—members determine whether it is
worth their while to prevent adverse voting paths by voting strategically rather than sincerely. For this reason, Range and Independence
are flipsides of a coin. Members will seek to thwart path-dependent
outcomes that are the product of structure-induced equilibrating rules
based upon information that demonstrates either that underlying preferences cycle, or that weighted preferences counsel against being led
down the agenda setter’s intended voting path. The same processes

130

Riker & Brams, supra note 127, at 354–56 (providing illustration).

Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 514 (1981). Shepsle and Weingast responded to Gordon Tullock’s claim that vote trading avoids cycling. Id. at 504. Tullock’s result obtains when legislators
have different intensities of preference, but logrolling can yield cycles when they do not.
131

132 Riker and Brams have observed that Congress sometimes restricts formal amendments
relative to potential options, thus limiting the requisite number of binary comparisons to disclose
a cycle. Riker & Brams, supra note 127, at 354. Shepsle and Weingast have identified mechanisms that forge “structure induced equilibria” with the effect of precluding cycles. Shepsle &
Weingast, supra note 131, at 504.
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sometimes avoid nominal Condorcet winners that thwart intensely opposing minority interests.
Virtually all state legislative processes include committee structures, calendaring rules, and formal orders of proceeding. They also
have some degree of involvement by the governor in the formation of
policy. Each also includes a role for judicial checks on legislative outputs. These formal and informal mechanisms combine to allow legislators to identify sensitive points in the legislative process at which
there is a possibility of codifying outcomes that risk undermining collective welfare, whether assessed based upon ordinal rankings or intensities of preference. This information allows members at these
critical junctures (veto gates or negative legislative checkpoints) either
to force inaction, encourage alternative (and preferred) voting paths,
or to exercise appropriate threats to negotiate substantive change in
the bill itself.
The emerging picture is of a rough-and-tumble quasi market
where votes take the place of money and where effective legislators
bargain in a manner that allows them to express cardinal preferences
(thus relaxing Independence) over matters of particular concern to
themselves and their constituents. This includes the power to avoid
having the legislature as a whole act on options (thus adhering to
Range) when members determine in matters with sufficiently high
stakes that there is insufficient support for enacting legislative change.
Some play this game better than others, of course, and there is no
denying that formal legislative rules affect substantive outcomes.
That, after all, is among the most basic insights of social choice. But
legislative rules are generally known in advance, and it is not surprising that those who play the game well have a deep appreciation for
how to work these rules to their advantage.
b. The Social Choice Profile of Courts: Relaxing Range,
Adhering to Independence
In contrast with legislatures, within appellate courts in a properly
docketed case, the absence of consensus—based either on cycling or
preference intensities—is not a basis for declining collective action,
taking the form of a judgment. This basic distinction translates into an
opposite social choice profile of judicial decisionmaking, as compared
with legislative decisionmaking, based, once again, on the critical criteria of Range and Independence.
This intuition is evident at two levels, within an individual case
and over sequential cases. To ease exposition, this Article illustrates
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with actual Supreme Court decisions. The microanalysis, explaining
how individual cases are decided, can be generalized to almost any
multimember appellate panel; the macroanalysis, explaining how
groups of cases are decided over time, can be generalized to other
common law judicial systems.133
i. Individual Case Decisionmaking
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,134 the Supreme Court extended
its 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller135—holding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms as applied to the federally controlled District of Columbia—to the City of
Chicago. The plaintiff, McDonald, presented two arguments supporting his challenge to Chicago’s handgun ban. First, he argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment as a fundamental right, thus applying it to state and
local governments.136 Second, he argued that despite 150-plus years of
precedent nullifying the Clause, the Second Amendment was a Fourteenth Amendment privilege or immunity.137 To rule for McDonald,
an individual jurist would have had to find in his favor on at least one
of these two theories. The Court ruled for McDonald, however, based
upon combined opinions in which separate majorities rejected each of
those theories. This case, and others like it,138 demonstrates that Supreme Court rules—as well as the rules of other appellate tribunals—
ensure outcomes in properly docketed cases even when member preferences embed cycles.
The McDonald Court issued five opinions, but for our purposes,
we need only focus on the three principal opinions. Justice Alito,
writing in part for a majority and in part for a plurality of four, determined that the Second Amendment was a fundamental right that applied to the states via the Due Process Clause.139 He further
determined that the facts did not justify revisiting longstanding prece133 The analysis can also be extended to civil law systems to the extent that the influence of
persuasive opinions operates similarly to stare decisis. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, The
Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law
State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (2005) (analyzing functional precedent in civil law systems).
134 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
135 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
136 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028.
137 See id.
138 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 99–117 (collecting cases).
139 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31, 3050 (Alito, J., plurality opinion).
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The embedded cycle in McDonald can be expressed in various
ways.147 Rather than treating each issue as a separate binary option,
Table 1 treats each opinion as comprising packaged issue resolutions
that, because none has majority support, each group of Justices implicitly seeks to rank ordinally.
The analysis reveals two critical features—multidimensionality
and asymmetry—that combine to explain the McDonald anomaly. In
addition to the two-issue dimensions, Table 1 reveals the following
asymmetry: Two camps, Alito (A) and Thomas (C), resolve each dispositive issue in opposite fashion yet reach the same judgment.148 On
these conditions, reasonable assumptions allow us to infer a cycle.
The Alito camp must rank second either Thomas’s opinion, which
reaches an opposite holding on each of the two underlying issues—
due process and privileges or immunities—while reaching the same
judgment of ruling for McDonald, or Breyer’s opinion (B), which resolves one of the two issues as Alito prefers—rejecting the privileges
or immunities analysis—while reaching an opposite holding on due
process along with an opposite judgment. Justice Thomas must rank
second either Justice Alito’s opinion, which reaches opposite holdings
on both controlling issues but reaches the same judgment, or Justice
Breyer’s opinion, which resolves one of the two issues as Thomas prefers—rejecting the due process analysis—while reaching an opposite
holding in privileges or immunities along with an opposite judgment.
Purely as a matter of intuition there is no way to know a priori how
the members of camps A or C would construct these ordinal rankings,
thus explaining why the rankings are necessarily implicit. The published opinions do not provide this information, and plausible assumptions can generate either a forward or reverse cycle.149 Although the
assumptions needed to generate each cycle are contestable, the case
possesses the characteristic features from which it is reasonable to infer a cycle. After all, the resulting forward and reverse cycles
147 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 436–47 (offering alternative presentations of
judicial cycling); David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183,
206–11 (2010) (illustrating paradox with Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587 (2007)); David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUENDO 823 (2011), http://groups.law.gwu.edu/LR/ArticlePDF/79-Arguendo-Cohen.pdf (extending analysis of precedent-based voting paradox to McDonald).
148 When preferences are symmetrical, camps resolving dispositive issues in opposite fashion also reach opposite judgments, thus flattening dimensionality. See Stearns, supra note 145, at
117–21 (illustrating this principle with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)).
149 These cycles take the following forms: Justice Alito: ABC; Justice Breyer: BCA; Justice
Thomas: CAB or Justice Alito: ACB; Justice Breyer: BAC; Justice Thomas: CBA.
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(ApBpCpA or CpBpApC, respectively) derive from each possible
ranking for each individual camp.
The implications for appellate judicial decisionmaking are important. Recall that legislatures need not act when members discover cycling preferences through whatever means. Instead, legislatures can
remain inert, defaulting to the status quo. By contrast, when appellate
judges are called upon to resolve properly docketed cases, they employ decision rules that produce a judgment whether or not preferences cycle.150 This holds even though the case might forge doctrine
along a particular issue dimension that thwarts the preferences of the
deciding jurists. Outcome voting accomplishes this by restricting
Range—forcing a binary outcome choice—even when majority issue
resolutions, considered separately, reveal a cycle.
ii. Stare Decisis: The Single-Dimensional Case
In a stare decisis regime, cycling can arise across separate majority opinions. We first evaluate stare decisis in a single-dimensional
case and then in a pair of cases that combine to reveal an embedded
cycle. Under the presumptive stare decisis regime, Supreme Court
Justices inquire whether a previously resolved case—the precedent—
governs the case under review. Stare decisis shares a common characteristic with outcome voting. By inquiring whether an earlier case
controls, the Court limits binary comparisons relative to options. The
regime presumptively disallows an independent inquiry into how the
present case would be resolved absent the precedent. With two votes
over three potential issues—(1) how to resolve case A, and
(2) whether case A controls case B, but not (3) how to resolve case B
absent controlling case A—the stare decisis regime stabilizes doctrine.
Depending on the underlying preference configurations, this regime
can either generate a Condorcet winner, or it can limit dimensionality
(by disallowing an independent assessment of the second case absent
the precedent) so as to mask a cycle.
The combined outcome-voting and stare decisis regime further
encourages Justices to vote consistently with their sincere views on
issues within cases and on the precedential relationship between cases.
This analysis is not contingent upon the normative merit of any particular jurisprudential views; rather the more limited claim is that Jus150 For an analysis reconciling this general observation about appellate judicial practice
with the Supreme Court’s power of docket control, see STEARNS, supra note 97, at 194–97, which
explains the twin roles of certiorari and standing in limiting doctrinal path manipulation and
which relates the analysis to the judicial obligation to resolve properly docketed cases.
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tices are rarely motivated to depart from their own sincerely held
views, however derived.
To illustrate, consider Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.151 Although the Supreme Court once again fractured, this time its combined opinions included a Condorcet winner.
The Court issued the following opinions: (1) a plurality decision by
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter;152 (2) a partial dissent and
partial concurrence in the judgment by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia, White and Thomas;153 and (3) alternative
partial dissents and partial concurrences in the judgment by Justices
Blackmun154 and Stevens.155 To simplify, we can treat the plurality coalition as moderate, the first partial-concurrence and partial-dissent
coalition as conservative, and the second such coalition as liberal.
Casey addresses whether Pennsylvania’s abortion restrictions violated the fundamental right to abort announced in the landmark 1973
decision, Roe v. Wade.156 The moderates divided that question as follows: (1) should Roe v. Wade be overturned, and (2) if not, does Roe
prohibit some or all of the Pennsylvania abortion restrictions?157 The
moderates ruled that Roe’s “basic holding” should be maintained.158
They proceeded to revise two aspects of Roe. First, they downgraded
abortion from a “fundamental” right to a liberty interest.159 Second,
they relaxed the trimester framework to elevate the state’s claimed
interest in the potential life represented by the fetus.160 Applying this
new framework, the plurality sustained all provisions of the statute—
including a controversial parental notification provision—except for
the spousal notification provision.161 The conservatives would instead
have overturned Roe and upheld all of the Pennsylvania abortion restrictions.162 The liberals would have retained Roe entirely and would
151

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

152

Id. at 843–911 (plurality opinion).

153

Id. at 944–79 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
154 Id. at 922–43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
155

Id. at 911–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

156

Id. at 844 (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

157

Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46, 879 (plurality opinion).

158

Id. at 845–46.

159

Id. at 846–53; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 155.

160

Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–73.

161

Id. at 901.

162

Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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than spousal notification, the conservative and moderate positions are
eligible. The moderate position is narrower, and thus controlling, because it would retain Roe, albeit in modified form. The moderate position would therefore sustain fewer abortion laws than would the
conservative position.170 For the part of the opinion striking down the
spousal notification provision, the moderates and liberals are eligible.
The moderates again control because, whereas the liberals would retain Roe in its entirety, thus striking down a broader set of laws (including all the restrictive provisions of the challenged Pennsylvania
statute), the moderates’ revised Roe formulation instead struck down
only the spousal notification provision.171
This analysis reveals why, in general, jurists are not motivated to
depart from sincerely held views. As Casey illustrates, all three camps
encourage doctrine closer to their ideal points by voting sincerely, not
strategically. The moderates forge preferred doctrine by expressing
views consistent with their ideal point, and were the liberal and conservative camps to vote other than sincerely, they would move doctrine in the opposite ideological direction.
This is not to suggest that there is no room for strategy in Supreme Court decisionmaking or in appellate judicial decisionmaking
more generally. There is an important, albeit limited, opportunity for
strategic voting affecting the ability to give an opinion precedential
status. Because only a majority opinion can overturn a prior Supreme
Court case, in rare instances, a Justice embracing a more extreme
ideal point will moderate his or her view to elevate a potential narrowest grounds opinion to majority status.172 The limited strategy involves moving toward a more moderate position along a singledimensional scale.
The analysis demonstrates why, in general, appellate jurists adhere to Arrovian Independence and thus vote sincerely. The publication of written opinions reinforces this incentive.173 Prior publication
170 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
171 See id. at 900.
172 For an illustration, see Stearns, supra note 169, at 333–35, which explains Justice Scalia’s
voting strategy in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). See also Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v.
Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1903, 1920 (2001) (explaining the conservative camp’s decision in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), to join the per curiam’s equal protection analysis based on the
perceived need to provide appearance of a united front in a historic case controlling the 2000
presidential election).
173 Recent decades have witnessed a notable decline in published opinions in the federal
appellate courts. See William Richman & William Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
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raises the cost of departing from previously expressed views by inviting criticism by other jurists, academic commentators, and the media.174 One consequence is that Justices generally prefer to devise
distinctions—often clever ones—rather than to expressly depart from
prior opinions that they joined, at least without a justification (for example, a contrary controlling opinion).
iii. Deciding Multiple Cases: Stare Decisis and Judicial
Path Dependence175
Although the Casey opinions fell along a single dimension, stare
decisis sometimes expands dimensionality with the consequence of
masking a cycle over separate majority opinions. To illustrate, consider the following two cases decided on the same day, Crawford v.
Board of Education,176 and Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1.177 These cases are important not only in illustrating the Rangerestricting role of Supreme Court voting protocols, but also for their
independent implications for judicial treatment of direct democracy.178
Both cases involve whether a state that never mandated segregation
by law could be prevented from taking affirmative steps to integrate
public schools.179
In Crawford, California had passed a state constitutional amendment following a referendum process that began in the state general
assembly.180 The referendum prevented state courts from ordering integrative busing unless they first determined that a federal court
would conclude it was necessary to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection violation.181 Writing for a majority of six, Justice
Powell sustained the amendment against a federal equal protection
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 281–86 (1996)
(criticizing development as limiting flow of information concerning doctrinal development and
jurisprudential views).
174 For a discussion of how the publication of judicial opinions, in contrast with the opposite norm for legislative votes, promotes differential voting behavior across these two institutions, see Stearns, supra note 65, at 1259 n.153.
175 For adapted portions of the following discussion, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4,
at 458–64.
176 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
177 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
178 See infra Part III (applying social choice analysis to Crawford and Seattle).
179 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 530–33; Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 457–58.
180 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 531–32.
181 Id. at 529. The referendum responded to a decision of the California Supreme Court
that interpreted the state constitution to allow reasonable steps to abate de facto segregation.
Id. at 530–32
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tinguish the two cases.190 For our immediate purposes, resolving
whether the cases are distinguishable is unnecessary.191 Holding the
merits aside, a majority of five—Powell, Burger, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, and Marshall—wrote or joined opinions claiming that the
two cases should be resolved in the same manner. And yet, separate
majorities resolved the two cases in opposite fashion on the same day.
These cases demonstrate that in a regime of stare decisis, two separate majority decisions can embed a cycle. Consider the three separate and overlapping majorities. One majority seeks to sustain the
Crawford amendment against the equal protection challenge. A second majority seeks to strike down the Seattle School District initiative
based upon equal protection. And a third majority seeks to resolve
these cases consistently such that both cases are either upheld or
struck down. Obviously, it is not possible to satisfy all three
majorities.
The Range-restricting quality of stare decisis emerges when we
imagine how these outcomes might have changed had the two cases
been issued one year apart, rather than on the same day. If we assume that the Justices vote consistently with their preferences as expressed in the opinions that they drafted or joined in Crawford and
Seattle School District, thus adhering to Independence, then the order
in which the cases were presented for decision would potentially control both case outcomes. After Crawford initially sustained the challenged law, the five Justices in Seattle School District with asterisks
next to their names would not ask how to resolve that later case as a
matter of first impression, but rather, would ask whether Crawford
controls Seattle School District. If the Justices voted sincerely, they
would answer yes, thus also sustaining the Seattle School District initiative. Conversely, after Seattle School District initially struck down
the challenged initiative, the same five Justices would later ask if Seattle School District governs Crawford. Voting sincerely, this majority
would also vote to strike down the Crawford amendment. The actual
cases were presented at the same time, such that neither case controlled the other as precedent. As a result, the Crawford amendment
was sustained and the Seattle School District initiative was struck
down, thus thwarting the majority favoring consistency.
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Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 490 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).

For a discussion distinguishing the outcomes based upon the different forms of direct
democracy through which the two laws were enacted, see infra Part III.A.
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Like outcome voting, stare decisis—meaning presumptive deference to the Court’s prior decisions192—operates as a Range restriction.
Recall that social choice reveals the need for the same number of binary comparisons as options to determine the social significance of
institutional outcomes.193 With more options than permitted amendments, or with a bar to reviving defeated alternatives to pit them
against later victors, it is not possible to discern the outcome’s social
significance, meaning whether or not it is a Condorcet winner or the
arbitrary product of a voting path. As we have seen, whereas legislative rules often limit votes relative to options, informal rules open
Range within legislatures,194 thus allowing disclosure of cycles, or intense minority opposition, especially in high-stakes matters.195 Within
the framework of social choice, stare decisis operates as a timehonored cycle-breaking rule that ensures outcomes by preventing an
option defeated in a prior round from being later pitted against the
eventual winner. That is why Crawford followed by Seattle School
District potentially produces opposite holdings in both cases as compared with Seattle School District followed by Crawford.196
Of course, the differing order of presentation might not have produced these results. Some or all of the Justices who viewed the cases
as indistinguishable when stare decisis was not in play might have devised a clever distinction to avoid the obligation of stare decisis in the
second case. In doing so, however, these Justices would necessarily
embed a new set of distinctions—quite possibly problematic ones—in
developing doctrine.197 Recall that published opinions that the Justices wrote or joined raise the cost of departing from the earlier expression of legal principle.198 The argument is not that Justices never
depart from sincere positions. Rather it is that the cost of doing so
promotes adherence to Independence. In addition, outcome voting
and stare decisis break potential voting cycles, thereby ensuring out192 For a discussion of external benefits and policy justifications for stare decisis, see
STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 423–29.
193

See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

See William H. Riker, The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on
Amendments, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 349 (1958) (discussing the congressional rule limiting votes
relative to options); see also STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 144.
194

195 See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (discussing how formal and informal
legislative processes disclose relevant information).
196 For a discussion of the relationship between path dependence and standing doctrine, see
STEARNS, supra note 97, at 170–97.
197

For a general discussion, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 462–63.
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comes and relaxing Range. This is opposite the social choice profile
of the legislature.199
The preceding analysis helps to explain why the judiciary is
widely viewed as a nondemocratic institution.200 Courts, unlike legislatures, are generally obligated to act, and knowing this, litigants often
seek opportunities to force courts to resolve policy issues that legislatures are unwilling to act on given their power to remain inert.201
Nothing in this analysis undermines the merits of constitutional judicial review. The judicial Range restriction described above has oftentimes produced compelling results. The reluctance of state
legislatures in the South, and of Congress, to embrace needed reforms
during the period of racially segregated schools, for example, motivated the NAACP to pursue a strategy of favorable case orderings
targeting important changes in Supreme Court doctrine.202 The campaign to end state-sanctioned practices restricting women based upon
archaic and overbroad suppositions concerning sex roles followed a
similar course.203 In each instance, it was the judicial inability to avoid
action, and the assumption that the judiciary, and eventually the Supreme Court, would resolve the cases that produced cries of unfair
removal of issues from the longer, and more tedious, road of democratic resolution by those opposing the resulting doctrinal changes.204
See supra Part II.B.1.a.
During his confirmation hearing for Chief Justice, then–Circuit Court Judge John G.
Roberts made a consistent observation:
As [Chief Justice John] Marshall explained, we have to decide a case. If the argument is that it’s inconsistent with the Constitution, we have to decide that. Therefore, we have that authority, and I believe that’s consistent with the intent of the
Framers.
But it does mean . . . that judges should be very careful to make sure they’ve
got a real case or controversy before them, because that is the sole basis for the
legitimacy of them acting in the manner they do in a democratic republic. They’re
not accountable to the people.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be the Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 342 (2005) (statement
of J. Roberts).
201 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 197–98.
202 For a detailed discussion and analysis, see STEARNS, supra note 97, at 187–89.
203 In fact, the judicially created, sex-based equal protection doctrine is ironically credited
with defeating the Equal Rights Amendment. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
204 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual
Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 776–77 (1998) (decrying the Supreme Court’s “judicial activism” and successful efforts of organizations like the ACLU to achieve policy change via the
courts that they could not accomplish in legislatures).
199
200
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This remains the cry when more current contentious issues are
presented for judicial resolution. The label “antidemocratic” has been
applied in the contexts of abortion, same-sex marriage, and a variety
of other fundamental rights claims that have moved from hot political
issues to vehicles for doctrinal reform.205 In each instance, the distinguishing characteristics of legislatures—adherence to Range and relaxed Independence—and of courts—relaxed Range and adherence
to Independence206—motivated praise or scorn depending on the side
of the underlying substantive issue on which the commentator
stands.207
Direct democracy, as shown below, bears features that more
closely resemble judicial review than legislative decisionmaking. But
unlike judicial review, which relies upon a higher external source of
constitutional authority to limit legislative powers, direct democracy
limits such powers based strictly on raw electoral preferences registered ordinally along isolated policy dimensions merely because the
plebiscite question has been put to the voters.
2. The Social Choice Profile of Direct Democracy: Legislatures
or Appellate Courts?
Properly balloted initiatives and referendums ensure outcomes
without regard to the preference profile of voters. Regardless of the
nature of electoral preferences, once balloted, a plebiscite will produce a collective resolution. The regime places a binary choice—pass
or reject the proposal—before a large number of voters, subject to a
default rule of inaction in the event of a tie.208 With large numbers,
ties are sufficiently improbable that a collective outcome is virtually
guaranteed. The electoral binary choice is structurally parallel to the
binary choice—affirm or reverse—presented to an appellate court. In
both instances, whether the participants’ preferences are neatly al205 See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkerson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (arguing that both Heller and Roe suffer from “transfer of power
to judges from the political branches of government—and thus, ultimately, from the people
themselves”).
206 See Maxwell L. Stearns, supra note 101, at 124–25. This account is causal, not merely
correlative. Institutions lacking these characteristics would be competed away in favor of those
possessing them. See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 68–69 (describing evolutionary social choice
analysis of legislatures and appellate courts).
207 This is not to suggest that all commentators arguing for or against judicial intervention
are doing so based upon which strategy is more effective, as opposed to based upon a principled
understanding of the proper legislative and judicial roles in a scheme of separation of powers.
208 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(a) (“An initiative statute or referendum approved by
a majority of the votes thereon takes effect the day after the election . . . .”).
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igned, yielding a Condorcet winning outcome, or prone to a cycle, thus
risking an outcome that thwarts majority preferences on some dimension, the binary outcome choice—pass or reject the plebiscite, or affirm or reverse the lower court judgment—forces collective
institutional action.209
Direct democracy further resembles appellate court decisionmaking in its tendency toward median outcomes. Generally speaking,
when there is a median voter position on the issue put to a plebiscite,
the outcome will reflect that position.210 Although some qualification
is required, this is almost true as a matter of definition. When preferences align along a single-dimensional spectrum, the median voter result necessarily obtains, at least assuming fair electoral representation
and no voter confusion, or alternatively, that any nonparticipation or
confusion is sufficiently evenly dispersed as to avoid systemic
distortion.211
Like appellate courts, direct democracy generally honors Arrovian Independence, or sincere voting, respecting the binary choice
to pass or oppose a plebiscite. In a large-number electoral setting,
strategic voting is very nearly impossible to accomplish. Even if
agreements to swap votes—“I’ll vote for your proposed plan to approve private religious school tax vouchers if you vote for my proposed plan to increase public school funding”—are not legally
prohibited,212 such strategies are beset by problems of high information and enforcement costs.
Like judicial decisionmaking, direct democracy relaxes Range—
there will be an outcome without regard to preference structures—
and adheres to Independence—there is little opportunity for strategic
voting behavior. Plebiscite voters generally gain little or nothing by
voting other than consistently with sincere policy preferences. This
follows from the median voter theorem213: along a single-dimensional
scale, constituents occupying more extreme positions to the right or
See Stearns, supra note 65, at 1260–62.
See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 96–97 (explaining outcome of median voter
position).
211 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 100 (explaining that voters may continue
supporting candidates in their ideological direction even when these candidates converge on the
median position).
212 Thus, although the California Electoral Code prohibits monetary and nonmonetary consideration for votes, see CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522 (West 2010), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Porter v. Bowen, 518 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2008), rejected the
application of section 18522 to prohibit vote trading absent additional consideration. See id. at
1182, 1185–86.
213 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 96–101 (describing theorem).
209
210
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left of the median voter will prefer options closer to (but on their side
of) the ideal point of the median voter to options on the opposite side
of the median voter. Although voters might be disappointed that
presented options are moderated relative to their ideal points, voting
insincerely moves policy away from, rather than toward, a voter’s
ideal point.214 The median voter theorem predicts that, in a single
stage election, rational candidates tend to move toward the median
voter.215 Similarly, plebiscite voting would also appear to push policy
in the direction of the median voter in an effort to appeal to more
voters. Despite this intuition, plebiscites might sometimes thwart median voter preferences.
Consider two voter-preference configurations, those in which
preferences are nicely aligned, yielding a Condorcet winner, and those
in which they are not, yielding a cycle. Such cycles can arise in two
situations. In the first, cycling affects sequential plebiscites. As
demonstrated below, these situations are likely to produce path-dependent but stable outcomes. In the second, cycling lurks in the background of isolated initiatives. The latter cycles are a consequence of
restricting voter Range by disallowing separate consideration along
the dimension of choosing to resolve the underlying issue today or to
leave it instead with legislative process (or more bluntly, to say “not
now”). By removing the inertial option, these “plebiscycles” pose a
serious challenge to the descriptive claim of plebiscites as democratic.
a. The Single-Dimensional Case
Assuming no voter confusion, a regime that aligns policy with
voter preferences registered along a specified issue dimension appears
to be a sound approach in resolving discrete policy questions. Under
these conditions, if the purpose of placing a given proposal in the form
of a plebiscite is to discern majoritarian electoral preferences, then
assuming representative turnout and no systemic confusion, direct democracy will tend to move policy from the status quo toward the ideal
point of electoral median. Other mechanisms (like polling) can also
identify median voter preferences, but polling results are often contestable and polling lacks the institutional legitimacy to force policy
change.
When relevant alternatives align along a single-dimensional scale,
plebiscites tend to move policy in the direction of a Condorcet winner
214 As used here, a voter’s ideal point corresponds to her first-choice policy position along a
single-dimensional ideological spectrum. See id. at 96 (defining ideal point).
215 See id.
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even if the plebiscites themselves invite extreme policy shifts. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.216
Figure 2. Policy Location in a Single-Dimensional–Issue Spectrum
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Assume a single-dimensional ideological spectrum with evenly dispersed voters. The potential policy positions are marked at increments one through nine, with the median voter’s ideal point at five. If
a plebiscite operates against a background rule at policy-position nine
and offers voters the chance to move policy to seven, the initiative will
pass as a majority prefers the policy change, which moves in the direction of, but not quite to, the median voter’s ideal point. Notably, the
same result obtains if the starting point and the initiative are on opposite sides of the median voter’s ideal point. If, for example, the status
quo is position one and the initiative is position seven, the initiative,
once again, is likely to pass as it moves policy closer to the median
voter’s ideal point.
In both examples, although the initiative policy is more extreme
than the median voter’s ideal point (compare positions seven and
five),217 nothing precludes a later plebiscite from moving closer to
five.218 The sequence might produce strong policy moves (or broad
swings) as compared with the median-voter benchmark, but this alone
Figure 3 is adapted from STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at 97 fig.3:1.
This extension of Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 980–81, demonstrates that
political entrepreneurs might sometimes place plebiscites at relatively extreme positions assuming that the median voter will not only assess the relevant policy distance to his or her ideal
point, but also the probability that the policy question will be revisited.
218 In some states, legislatures cannot overturn plebiscites through ordinary legislation, instead requiring a later plebiscite. See Matsusaka, supra note 30, at 187 (“Once approved, laws
enacted by direct democracy may be easy or difficult to amend: at one extreme, California initiatives can only be amended by another initiative, while other states allow the legislature to amend
them as ordinary statutes.”).
216
217
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does not foreclose future moves toward the median along the singledimensional scale.219
Even when an issue can be cast along a single-dimensional scale,
however, there is a risk that direct democracy might not produce socially optimal outcomes. This takes us back to the difference between
the application of Independence in a judicial and legislative setting.
For ballot measures that risk a disproportionate effect on an identifiable class of voters, for example affirmative action for African American voters,220 or same-sex marriage restrictions for gay and lesbian
voters,221 when intensity of preferences is accounted for, the preferred
outcome might differ from that obtained through direct democracy’s
blunt choice mechanism. Even if the plebiscite captures median electoral preferences, thus satisfying the Condorcet criterion, that criterion does not account for intensities of voter preference.222
A defining characteristic of legislative decisionmaking is a series
of decision junctures—veto gates or negative legislative checkpoints—
at which participants and affected constituencies can register not
merely ordinal preferences but also preference intensities. The process of registering preference intensities often involves vote trading—
meaning, basing reciprocal commitments on other, sometimes unrelated, bills. Within legislatures, registering preference intensities on
one issue dimension can affect outcomes along separate issue dimensions. Because direct democracy supplements, rather than replaces,
legislative lawmaking,223 this insight carries normative implications for
direct democracy.
Assume, for example, that a legislature is considering restricting
or ending affirmative action in higher education within three years.
Imagine that those most opposed to the proposal negotiate having the
proposal dropped by agreeing to support separate measures that they
would otherwise be inclined to oppose. This might include, for exam219 This might explain the Oregon and Massachusetts case illustrations described by
Kousser and McCubbins. See infra text accompanying notes 229–31.
220 See Michael E. Rosman, Challenges to State Anti-Preference Laws and the Role of Federal Courts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 709, 709 (2010) (discussing recent “anti-preference”
referendums in states including California and Michigan aimed at ending race-conscience admissions to institutions of higher learning); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (sustaining the University of Michigan School of Law’s affirmative action program against an equal
protection challenge).
221 See Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power
of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 385, 393 n.70 (2010) (collecting bans on same-sex marriage enacted via initiative).
222 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing features of Condorcet criterion).
223 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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ple, funding schemes benefiting schools located in high-value property
areas, or issues entirely unrelated to education. In the next election
cycle, however, a proposed initiative seeking to ban affirmative action
is approved consistently with majority electoral preferences. When
the issue is viewed strictly along a single-dimensional scale, the outcome honors the Condorcet criterion. This does not, of course, mean
that the policy is optimal. And the problem is not merely due to the
possibility that opponents might hold stronger views than the majority. It is also that the opponents, through their representatives, made
concessions in the legislature respecting other issues in an effort to
avoid a similar legislative result, only to then have their reciprocal
gains—declining to end affirmative action—taken away through the
initiative process. In effect, the initiative process has prevented reciprocal commitments made in the legislature, where Independence is relaxed but Range is adhered to, from being honored in the direct
democracy process, where Independence is adhered to but Range is
relaxed. Moreover, even unsuccessful plebiscites force affected interest groups to defend prior legislative successes, often taking the form
of legislative inaction on bills affecting them, in successive election
cycles.224
This analysis raises analogous concerns to when legislative victories in one period are undermined in a subsequent period of constitutional litigation. Any payoffs associated with having the measure
passed in its final form are undermined when the judiciary, which has
to resolve the case, strikes down the law. This is one argument in
favor of judicial restraint: restraint facilitates a more robust set of exchanges in the legislative market, thus allowing participants not only
to register preferences ordinally, but also to commodify preferences
and to secure the benefits of reciprocal payoffs often embedded along
different legislative policy dimensions.225 The same argument generally applies to plebiscites.226
b. Dimensionality over Sequential Plebiscites
The prior discussion is not intended to suggest that all issues for
which multiple proposals can be assessed using a common unit of
224 For an analogous dynamic involving legislative rent extraction, see FRED MCCHESNEY,
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 55–66,
74–78 (1997), which demonstrates that the mere threat of regulation can coerce rents.
225 This is not to suggest that constitutional judicial review is unjustified; rather, it is to
suggest that even when judicial review is justified, it is not costless.
226 See infra text accompanying notes 277–82 (distinguishing special case of automatic
referendums).

360

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:311

tial elimination agenda,” namely C as the selected outcome, is not
merely arbitrary; it is Pareto inferior because no one prefers C to Q.230
The authors provide two historical accounts, from Oregon and
Massachusetts, that they claim illustrate sequential elimination agendas and thus initiative outcomes that cycle:
In 1990, the citizens of Oregon passed an initiative that
sought to reduce property taxes, and then, in 1996, they
passed another measure that limited the revenue available
for schools and other services that had been funded by property taxes. Just four years later in 2000, citizens passed an
initiative that established a “sufficiency standard” for funding based on the Oregon Quality Education Model that required a significant increase in state spending on education.
It is easy to see that following multiple ballot measures to
reduce taxes with one that instructs the legislature to increase education spending may be mutually inconsistent.
Similar contradictory initiatives occurred in Massachusetts. For example, in 1982, citizens voted to restrict radioactive waste disposal, but then in 1988, they failed to ban the
electric power plants that produced such nuclear waste.
Needless to say, citizens in these two time periods passed
measures that were largely at odds with each other—with the
1988 result perpetuating the problem that the 1982 initiative
sought to solve.
The above anecdotes suggest that the theoretical
problems of sequential elimination agendas have an empirical basis in the initiative process.231
And yet, these examples might illustrate a change in voter preferences, which move back and forth along a single-dimensional issue
continuum over time rather than a cycle.232 In Oregon, in periods one
and two, the voters elected to approve measures that reduced specific
taxes and school revenues, respectively. In period three, they passed
another initiative that imposed a sufficiency standard that required a
higher level of taxation and educational expenditures. In Massachusetts, in period one, the voters restricted radioactive waste disposal,
and in period two they declined to ban the electric power plants that
generated waste in need of storage.
In both accounts, the voters confronted sequential choices that
can be cast along a single-dimensional scale—restrictive-to-generous
230
231
232

Id.
Id. at 965–66 (footnotes omitted).
For a consistent result, see Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 66, at 702 n.67.
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tax-based allocations for improved quality of education in Oregon and
restrictive-to-permissive provision of radioactive waste storage facilities in Massachusetts—and have taken positions over time that reflect
a change in the location of the median voter’s ideal point respecting
the tradeoffs involved. One indication that this might not reflect a
cycle is that a single individual could rationally embrace such sequential choices. If asked today (period one) whether to buy a particular
good (say a nice automobile), I might do so, but if asked a year later
to continue allocating my scarce financial resources (car payments,
maintenance costs, and gas) to sustain the purchase (period two), I
might decline. The later decision reveals the benefit of more information about how much the car is worth to me and the true opportunity
cost of the allocated resources. Although buyer’s regret is unfortunate, and costly, it is not uncommon. In an extreme case, such a buyer
might sell the car to cut the losses. Buyer’s regret does not reflect a
cycle. Rather, it reflects a change of mind based upon newly acquired
information. Just as individuals can change their minds, so too can
enough group members to reverse a prior collective outcome.
Under some circumstances, however, sequential initiatives can
embed cycles over more than a single policy dimension. When this
occurs, contrary to the Oregon and Massachusetts illustrations, the
outcome is likely to be coherent but path dependent. This is most
likely when the first plebiscite, much like precedent in a judicial setting, effectively restricts Range for a critical subset of voters in a later
plebiscite. Although a rejected plebiscite does not legally foreclose
reconsideration in the same manner as, for example, a rejected constitutional challenge relied upon as precedent in a later case, in at least
some circumstances even rejected plebiscites can induce path
dependence.
Assume an initially approved plebiscite authorizing slot machines
at a race track. After the state has made funding commitments contingent on the success of the slots, a second plebiscite seeks to authorize zoning changes allowing secondary businesses, for example
restaurants and retail outlets, without which, the voters are then led to
believe, the slots will ultimately fail. Some voters who initially opposed both the slots initiative and the residential zoning change, might
support the latter initiative once they realize that otherwise the state
will renege on established slot-based funding commitments. If there
are enough such voters to tip the outcome, then the second initiative
will also pass. And yet, the combined policies, casinos and business
zoning near residential communities, is opposite what would have re-
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sulted had the choices been reversed. If the first plebiscite had instead
asked whether to permit business zoning near the residential community (as the anticipated price of a later referendum to approve slots),
the same group of marginal voters, along with those opposing the slots
no matter what, would vote no. With the zoning plebiscite defeated,
some who might have initially supported slots might then vote against
them, realizing that absent the zoning approval, the slots are destined
to fail. As in the judicial hypothetical based on Crawford and Seattle
School District,233 for sequential plebiscites, the ordering affects both
outcomes. Notice, however, that changing the order produces opposite, yet coherent, policy and that this follows whether the initial result
is to approve or reject the plebiscite.
As previously noted, a characteristic feature of cycling preferences is multiple-issue dimensions.234 This is what is at play in Table 4,
where the three players assess the policy choices over ABC and Q
along more than a single dimension, thus generating the cycle.235 In
the account of the Oregon and Massachusetts plebiscites offered by
Kousser and McCubbins, however, it appears as likely that the voters
produced results that shifted back and forth along a single-dimensional scale.236 The final plebiscite in each sequence was not resolved
in a manner contingent upon the resolution of an earlier plebiscite,
but rather pulled policy back from a position that a critical group of
voters later concluded had been pushed too far. Once again, when
policy options align along a single-dimensional scale, the plebiscite
process tends toward the median, or Condorcet, outcome, but not necessarily in a single round.
c. Plebiscycles: Cycling over Policy and the Choice of Collective
Decisionmaking Rule
“Plebiscycles” arise within single plebiscites that restrict Range
along a given policy dimension. This might apply broadly to plebiscites if we consider combining the underlying policy question with a
separate question concerning institutional choice. To illustrate, we
must first present three options along a single-dimensional spectrum
and then consider how the added dimension affects ordinal rankings.
Assume that three voters or blocs of voters hold three sets of
positions regarding a proposed initiative. The initiative can involve a
233
234
235
236

See
See
See
See

supra Part II.B.1.b.iii.
supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
supra Table 4.
Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 965–66.
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In this alternative version, camp C prefers ceding the substantive
policy to the legislature hoping for its defeat, rather than risking that
the initiative, which it opposes, passes. Once again, it is possible to
construct assumptions across the two dimensions that generate either
a forward cycle, ABC, BCA, CAB, or a reverse cycle, ACB, BAC,
CBA. In each of the preceding cycle-generating combinations (two
forward, two reverse), the assumptions needed to generate the ordinal
rankings are contestable. Specifically, each illustration includes one
set of seemingly counterintuitive assumptions.243 Although this is
often true of constructed cycles, it does not undermine the analysis.
Each cycling combination rests on either of the two possible orderings
over remaining options for each camp. It is certainly possible, for example, in the first illustration, where position C favors isolating the
issue for the initiative process but opposes the initiative, to construct
alternative preferences in which camps A and C each select moderate
legislative action (B) as their second choice. Similarly, it is possible in
the second variation, where camp C prefers to conjoin but oppose legislative policy change, that camps A and C prefer moderate legislative
action as a second choice.
To the extent that this is true, however, it has important, and potentially problematic, implications. The result in each instance would
be to flatten dimensionality such that moderate legislative action
emerges a Condorcet winner. Although this is certainly plausible, it
implies that there is invariably a normative justification grounded in
social choice for preferring moderate legislative action to the alternative of using the initiative process to promote (or risk) action in more
extreme form. And yet, electoral majorities do enact initiatives that
set policy at a more extreme point than the legislature would along the
relevant normative issue spectrum. This suggests there are potential
frustrated majorities when issues are combined as part of a larger legislative process.
Moderate legislative outcomes are often viewed as insufficient
half measures among those hungering for stronger policy change. Notice also that the line constructed in Table 7 between moderate legislative action and legislative inaction is a fine one. Depending on how
moderate the enacted policy, many voters might view the result as
243 In the first version, the counterintuitive ranking is CAB, where camp C believes that the
more extreme policy will provide the basis for a more effective campaign issue that will rally the
base than would opposing a more moderate legislative policy, and in the second, the counterintuitive ranking is ACB, where camp A prefers legislative defeat to rally its base rather than to
risk an entrenched moderate legislative policy.

2012]

DIRECT (ANTI-)DEMOCRACY

367

equivalent to inaction. Among major segments of the electorate, it is
not surprising that seeming middle positions prove more a source of
frustration than of settling compromise.244
As with outcome voting and stare decisis in a judicial context, the
binary choice to pass or oppose an initiative results from a Rangerestricted rule. Electoral voters do not consider the combined binary
choices over all options. As a result, the plebiscite outcome, whatever
it is, risks thwarting majority preferences for kicking the policy question, along with others, to the legislature to resolve in the complex and
messy course of legislative bargaining.
As public choice theorists have observed, it is difficult to demonstrate cycles empirically.245 But that is not because all decisions rest
neatly along isolated policy dimensions, thus yielding Condorcet winners. Rather it is because outcomes invariably reflect, or in the economists’ lingo, are endogenous to, the rules through which they are
chosen. And yet, there are hints. We know that most initiatives present issues in a more extreme form than that which a legislature would
likely adopt. Political entrepreneurs are rarely motivated to replicate
what a legislature would enact were it to act on the issue.246 Conversely, when the legislature fails to act on an issue, or acts in a manner widely deemed inadequate, there is often a sense that some
thwarted majority, one that combines those strongly favoring a policy
change and those who remain anxious about even the prospects of
moderate legislative action, would prefer to cut the legislature out of
the deal or to send it a strong signal to avoid future action. It cannot
be the case that both legislative processes and direct democracy routinely produce outcomes satisfying the Condorcet criterion. The very
244 For an analogous exchange on the role of constitutional compromise in the sensitive
area of abortion, compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 866–67 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the
Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe . . . , its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not
carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls
the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”), with id. at 995 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court’s description of the place of Roe in the social history
of the United States is unrecognizable. Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the
deeply divisive issue of abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it, by elevating it to
the national level where it is infinitely more difficult to resolve.”).
245 See, e.g., Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 131 (attributing absence of verifiable cycling to
cost-raising institutional mechanisms in Congress); Tullock, supra note 127, at 189 (attributing
absence of verifiable legislative cycling to logrolling).
246

See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 953–54.
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existence of these competing venues for policy change in the states
that have direct democracy proves otherwise.
Legislative decisionmaking is inordinately messy. It is a cliché to
quote Winston Churchill for the proposition that “democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have
been tried.”247 But it would also be ironic in an Article using social
choice to analyze direct democracy to ignore his central insight. The
democracy Churchill had in mind bore no resemblance to the process
of initiatives and referendums now commonplace among the states.
The same is true of republicanism as Madison understood the term.
Within virtually all normative democratic theories,248 the legislative
branch is regarded as the most democratic and the judiciary is considered to be the least.249 Part of this, undoubtedly, is owing to the manner of selection and the lack of direct electoral accountability. But as
this Article shows, another equally important part involves the process through which the institutional decisions are made. These two
aspects of institutions are not disconnected; instead, they are inextricably linked. The judiciary is antidemocratic in large part because its
decision rules generally force binary choices over decisions to affirm
or reverse, with the significant possibility that in resolving the case,
law will be made. This process will occur even if those called upon to
make the decision, or those most affected by it, do not believe that the
time is right for the question to be asked and answered with the result
of establishing precedent. The manner of judicial selection merely reinforces the choice of a decision rule obligating the courts to decide.
By contrast, democratic lawmaking includes not only the power
to resolve policy issues, but also the power to control the timing of
decision.250 Democratic policymaking institutions also have the power
to weigh preference intensities rather than to register preferences
strictly ordinally. Once again, the method of choosing legislators reinforces the decisionmaking rule by encouraging inertia, and thus proRESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CONRESEARCH SERVICE 83 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (“Many forms of Government have
been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is
perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government
except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”).
248 See supra note 93.
249 In this respect, the republican tradition is particularly distrustful of judicial legitimacy in
lawmaking. See Robert Justin Lipkin, We Are All Judicial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181,
183 (2008) (noting that rule by “elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges . . . is antithetical to
republican democracy”).
250 See STEARNS, supra note 97, at 198–204 (distinguishing judicial and legislative decisionmaking based on power to control timing of decisions).
247
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moting legitimacy of outcomes, when there is not sufficient
justification for policy change. Appellate courts lack these features; so
too does direct democracy. This does not mean that direct democracy
should play no role in policymaking. But it does mean that it is important to consider the antidemocratic features of direct democracy
rather than assuming that the mere fact of electoral voting renders the
process democratic.
Empirical surveys suggest broad general support for direct democracy.251 Moreover, although the polling data is dated, one study
shows that racial minorities favor direct democracy by a wide margin.252 These data are important because they support the intuition
that, in many areas of policymaking, direct democracy is widely accepted. This is not surprising. If asked whether it is appropriate for
the electorate to play a larger role in policymaking, it would perhaps
be surprising if the answer were no. Although minorities are part of
the group seeking greater policy control, many proposed policies affecting demographic minorities do not survive legislative decisionmaking processes.253 Over a broad range of issues, certainly not limited to
those of minority concern, it is the very fact that legislatures fail to act,
or act in middling ways, that pushes advocates toward direct
democracy.254
III.

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS

OF

DIRECT (ANTI-)DEMOCRACY

We now turn to the implications for allocating policymaking between the two complementary institutions: legislatures and direct democracy. This Part briefly considers four sets of normative
implications of the preceding social choice analysis. First, it compares
the presumptive validity of voter initiatives versus referendums, especially in areas that implicate traditional equal protection concerns.
This analysis returns us to the analysis of Crawford and Seattle School
District. Second, it considers the implications of judicial debates con251 See, e.g., Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey Karp, Popular Attitudes Towards Direct Democracy 23 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished paper prepared for American Political Science
Association Meeting), available at http://faculty.wwu.edu/donovat/bdkapsa03.pdf (citing studies
finding broad popular support across four countries for direct democracy, and sixty-seven percent support in California and eighty percent support in Washington State).
252 See Matsusaka, supra note 30, at 201 (observing that “racial minorities overwhelmingly
support the initiative process—57 percent to 9 percent for blacks and 73 percent to 3 percent for
Latinos in a 1997 poll”).
253 See, e.g., id.
254 See Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, supra note 251, at 8 (describing hypotheses advanced by
Professors Russell Dalton and Ronald Inglehart claiming that dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative democracy helps stimulate support for direct democracy as an alternative).
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cerning possible constitutional limits on raising the level of decisionmaking for policies that affect particular minority groups. This
discussion also has implications for Crawford and Seattle School District, along with Hunter v. Erickson255 and Romer v. Evans.256 Third,
this Part considers the implications of direct democracy in the context
of the Court’s animus-based equal protection cases, including Romer,
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,257 and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.258 Finally, it considers the
famous footnote four from United States v. Carolene Products Co.,259
and its underlying intuitions about legislative market failure as compared with this Article’s observations about direct democracy. This
Part concludes with some general observations about optimizing the
complementarity of these two lawmaking institutions.
A. Initiatives Versus Referendums: Crawford and Seattle School
District Revisited
Recall that in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, a Washington initiative banned school boards from using integrative busing
absent a determination that busing was necessary to redress state or
federal equal protection violations.260 In Crawford v. Board of Education, a California referendum banned state courts from ordering integrative busing unless they determined that busing was necessary to
redress an identified federal equal protection violation.261 The Washington initiative contained the more liberal policy by allowing busing
to redress not only federal, but also state, equal protection violations.262 Despite this, and notwithstanding a crossover majority of Justices who favored like treatment of both cases,263 two simultaneous
majorities sustained the California amendment264 but struck down the
Washington initiative.265
Professor Eule offered an important early insight that might help
to reconcile the results.266 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1982).
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 532 (1982).
Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 463.
See supra Table 3.
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545.
Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 470.
Eule, supra note 54, at 1566–67.
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arguments for treating state laws enacted through direct democracy
differently from laws enacted through the legislative process.267 And
yet, Eule observed, it is notable that the Court sustained the state law
enacted through a legislative referendum, but struck down the law enacted through a voter initiative.268
Despite the Court’s rejection of the initiative process as a ground
upon which to strike down a challenged state law,269 Eule’s observation carries important implications that are consistent with the preceding analysis. Although minorities can seek to protect themselves by
blocking or modifying proposed legislation concerning them, they also
can protect their interests in other ways, thus leveraging blocking or
modifying powers to other ends.270 If a policy enacted by a state legislature appears adverse to minority interests, it is certainly possible—
although difficult if not impossible to verify empirically—that minority-negotiated benefits appear elsewhere in the overall complex package of legislation.271 The payoffs for supporting a bill limiting busing
to integrate public schools, for example, need not manifest themselves
in moderated substantive policy (e.g., extending the phase-out period), although it certainly could. It could also manifest itself in some
other seemingly unrelated bill or set of bills that bear no surface connection to the substance of school integration. For example, as the
price for continuing busing, minority constituencies might support
programs helping other communities for which they bear part of the
general cost.
The argument is parallel to claims of unforeseen ripple effects
following regulatory interferences in private markets. One need not
demonstrate this at the level of specific forgone transactions. Just as
price theoretical models generally explain that regulatory interventions affect the manner in which markets clear by disallowing, or by
raising the cost of, certain private transactions,272 so too judicial decisions and plebiscites affect the manner in which legislative quasi markets clear by disallowing, or raising the cost of, certain legislative
267 See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143–44, 151 (1912) (relying on
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), to conclude that constitutional challenge to law enacted
through the initiative process presented a nonjusticiable political question).
268 See Eule, supra note 54, at 1566 (“In marked contrast to Initiative 350, Proposition 1
was a complementary plebiscite. . . . Admittedly, none of this is explicit in the two opinions.”).
269 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 151.
270 See Eule, supra note 54, at 1557.
271 Id. at 1556.
272 For a general introduction to price theory, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 4, at
29–41.

372

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:311

exchanges. Even if there is no constitutional basis for striking down
laws that emerge from direct democracy generally, there might be a
normative basis for applying different presumptions to plebiscites that
carry a different risk of affecting minorities in an adverse manner, including, most notably, initiatives, on the one hand, and referendums,
on the other.
Striking down a law on constitutional grounds is costly to democratic processes. Of course the costs are frequently justified by the
benefits of protecting individuals and groups who are treated adversely based upon illicit criteria, for example, race, sex, or sexual orientation,273 or protecting individuals based upon rights embedded in,
or inferred from, the Constitution. A cost of striking down legislation
on constitutional grounds is that it undermines confidence among legislators, voters, and affected groups that the outcomes of future legislative negotiations, respecting substance or unrelated matters, will be
preserved in the courts. While rejecting an initiative might not always
have the same consequence—although it can have path-inducing or
rent-extracting effects274—sustaining an initiative potentially holds the
same consequence as constitutional judicial review, namely undoing
implicit agreements that form part of a broad and more complex legislative bargain.
Legislative referendums, however, pose fewer risks. Even if the
referendum is one that identifiable minority interests oppose, the referendum itself follows the series of negotiated legislative processes.
Before the bill becomes law, the legislature refers the matter to the
electorate for an up-or-down vote. This cuts the governor out of the
deal, substituting a majority of the electorate in his or her place, and
there might be reason to assume that governors are systemically more
sympathetic to minority concerns than large electoral constituencies.
In fact, the executive veto has been shown to protect interest groups
against having legislatures renege on prior legislative payoffs.275 To
the extent that demographic minorities benefit from this gubernatorial
repeal-checking function, replacing a gubernatorial veto with an elec273 This is not to suggest that the normative concerns for these three categories are the
same. For a discussion of race-based equal protection jurisprudence, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 690–751 (3d ed. 2006); for a discussion of
gender-based classification, see CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 752–66; for a discussion of sexual orientation classification, see CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 812–13.
274 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
275 See W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group
Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555, 557–58, 561–66 (1979) (providing interest group
account of executive veto with supporting data).
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toral veto in the form of a referendum might be a cause for concern.
Despite this, the relatively large number of veto gates in the legislature, as compared with plebiscites, provides such groups substantially
greater protection in the context of referendums, which eliminate only
the veto, than of initiatives, which eliminate all veto gates.
This Article does not suggest that the Seattle School District and
Crawford majorities envisioned this sort of analysis but kept it to
themselves. In addition, none of this undermines the cycling anomaly
across these cases. So long as a majority of the deciding Justices regarded the cases as indistinguishable, the opposite results in the two
cases underscore the voting anomaly.276 Rather, along with Eule, this
Article suggests that despite doctrinal assertions to the contrary, the
Justices might have general intuitions about the value of legislative
versus other forms of decisionmaking that affect their presumptions
concerning particular plebiscites enacted with or without a legislative
imprimatur.
B. Level Shifting in a Multilevel Democracy
In his controversial Romer v. Evans dissent, Justice Scalia took
Justice Kennedy to task for applying rational basis scrutiny to Colorado Amendment 2, which banned sexual orientation as a protected
category in Colorado state or municipal antidiscrimination laws, while
nonetheless striking the law down.277 Although Justice Scalia’s discussion of whether minority sexual orientation provides the basis for suspect classification status is certainly more attention-getting, embedded
within Scalia’s analysis are important assertions concerning the role of
decisionmaking processes themselves as a potential rational justification in support of a law. Scalia maintained that if the relevant test is
rational basis, it is not irrational for a majority of Colorado voters to
remove policymaking from the municipal to the state level in an area
in which, Scalia claimed, a majority of Colorado voters had determined that policymaking had been driven by disproportionate influence of advocates for the LGBT community.278
Because Scalia’s analysis is important, it is quoted at length:
The central thesis of the Court’s reasoning is that any
group is denied equal protection when, to obtain advantage
(or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must have re276 See supra text accompanying notes 176–99 (describing voting anomaly in Seattle School
District and Crawford).
277 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 639–40 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 636, 640–41, 645–47.
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course to a more general and hence more difficult level of
political decisionmaking than others. The world has never
heard of such a principle . . . . And it seems to me most
unlikely that any multilevel democracy can function under
such a principle. For whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or
conferral of a benefit is prohibited, at one of the higher
levels of democratic decisionmaking (i.e., by the state legislature rather than local government, or by the people at large
in the state constitution rather than the legislature), the affected group has (under this theory) been denied equal protection. To take the simplest of examples, consider a state
law prohibiting the award of municipal contracts to relatives
of mayors or city councilmen. Once such a law is passed, the
group composed of such relatives must, in order to get the
benefit of city contracts, persuade the state legislature—unlike all other citizens, who need only persuade the municipality. It is ridiculous to consider this a denial of equal
protection, which is why the Court’s theory is unheard of.
The Court might reply that the example I have given is
not a denial of equal protection only because the same “rational basis” (avoidance of corruption) which renders constitutional the substantive discrimination against relatives (i.e.,
the fact that they alone cannot obtain city contracts) also automatically suffices to sustain what might be called the electoral-procedural discrimination against them (i.e., the fact
that they must go to the state level to get this changed). This
is of course a perfectly reasonable response, and would explain why “electoral-procedural discrimination” has not hitherto been heard of: A law that is valid in its substance is
automatically valid in its level of enactment. But the Court
cannot afford to make this argument, for as I shall discuss
next, there is no doubt of a rational basis for the substance of
the prohibition at issue here. The Court’s entire novel theory rests upon the proposition that there is something special—something that cannot be justified by normal “rational
basis” analysis—in making a disadvantaged group (or a nonpreferred group) resort to a higher decisionmaking level.
That proposition finds no support in law or logic.279
Other Justices have advanced similar arguments in the past. Consider the following excerpt from Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in
Seattle School District:
279

Id. at 639–40.
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Under today’s decision, this heretofore undoubted supreme authority of a State’s electorate is to be curtailed
whenever a school board—or indeed any other state board
or local instrumentality—adopts a race-specific program that
arguably benefits racial minorities. Once such a program is
adopted, only the local or subordinate entity that approved it
will have authority to change it. The Court offers no authority or relevant explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the ultimate sovereign power of a State to act with
respect to racial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a
strange notion—alien to our system—that local governmental bodies can forever pre-empt the ability of a State—the
sovereign power—to address a matter of compelling concern
to the State. The Constitution of the United States does not
require such a bizarre result.280
Finally, in an earlier related case, Hunter v. Erickson, Justice
White expressed a contrary view in striking down an “automatic referendum” demanding separate ratification by a majority of city voters as
a precondition to passing a municipal housing antidiscrimination
law.281 White explained:
Only laws to end housing discrimination based on “race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry” must run § 137’s
gantlet. It is true that the section draws no distinctions
among racial and religious groups. Negroes and whites, Jews
and Catholics are all subject to the same requirements if
there is housing discrimination against them which they wish
to end. But § 137 nevertheless disadvantages those who
would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral
discriminations as against those who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the real estate
market in their favor. The automatic referendum system
does not reach housing discrimination on sexual or political
grounds, or against those with children or dogs, nor does it
affect tenants seeking more heat or better maintenance from
landlords, nor those seeking rent control, urban renewal,
public housing, or new building codes.
Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and
white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is
that the law’s impact falls on the minority. The majority
needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a ref280 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 494–95 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
281 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390–91 (1969).
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erendum might be bothersome but no more than that. Like
the law requiring specification of candidates’ race on the ballot, § 137 places special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process. This is no more permissible than
denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.282
These opinions raise the question whether level shifting via plebiscite, and more specifically via initiative or automatic referendum, justifies a closer look at the law challenged on independent grounds
when the underlying claim arises separately from the nonjusticiable
Guarantee Clause. For present purposes, hold aside Justice Scalia’s
contentious claim respecting alleged disproportionate lobbying influence by the LGBT community over inclusion in state and local antidiscrimination laws.283 Whether or not Justice Scalia is correct that
any argument for a closer judicial look following a ratcheting up of the
required level of lawmaking for future policy changes is unheard of in
a multilevel democracy, the interesting question is whether there is a
sound normative basis for advocating a closer look based on this structural shift on the Romer facts. If the issue is simply about level shifting, it would be difficult to refute the claim advanced by Justice Scalia,
as well as Justice Powell in Seattle School District, that in such cases,
lower levels of governance could exert a counterintuitive policy lockin effect. By contrast, in Hunter, Justice White focuses solely on the
groups affected by the automatic referendum, without considering the
potential lock-in effect.
At first blush, Justice Scalia’s argument that lower levels of government cannot be permitted to lock in policy against change by
higher levels of government appears unassailable. Providing higher
status to policies enacted at higher levels is, after all, an integral feature of a multitiered lawmaking system. Federal statutes are subject
to constitutional judicial review and thus are subject to the Constitution as higher law. The same logic should apply within states. Local
laws are inferior to state law, and state law is inferior to state constitutional law, all of which is subordinate to federal law. Justice White’s
argument appears to merge two questions: Is there a substantive rule
against level shifting? And is there a prohibition against treating beneficiaries of housing discrimination laws—racial minorities primarily
among them—differently? The latter claim is entirely consistent with
Id. (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Clifford J. Rossky, Hard-Fought Gay Rights Victories Do Not Prove Group’s
‘Political Power,’ L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 26, 2007, at 6 (offering contrary assessment of relative
lobbying power of LGBT community).
282
283
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principles of equal protection, but the former one is swept through the
equal protection gate without parsing it as an independent claim.
And yet, if Justice White has merged two claims in Hunter, so too
has Justice Scalia in Romer. The issue is not merely whether level
shifting is permissible. Of course it is. Rather, the question is whether
level shifting that targets demographic minorities in a manner that effectively precludes their meaningful participation in democratic
processes and that threatens (and might actually accomplish) diminishing gains secured through that process provides the basis for closer
scrutiny of the underlying claim. Notice the nature of the laws that
the Court has struck down: an automatic referendum that allows a
majority of the electorate to undo the gains minorities have secured
through the city council, in Hunter,284 and an initiative prohibiting inclusion of protected minorities in antidiscrimination laws without an
opportunity to signal through the state-level veto gates the intensity
with which the LGBT community embraces its view of the relevant
policy question, in Romer.285
This analysis might help to resolve the apparent tension between
Crawford and Seattle School District. A legislative referendum comes
about only after the legislative process—veto gates and all—is complete. The process cuts the governor out of the deal, instead conferring alternative veto power upon the electorate. This is notable
inasmuch as the gubernatorial veto might preserve prior legislative
payoffs to affected groups,286 might prove the last venue for registering intensities of preference, and might facilitate tradeoffs among disparate constituencies. Legislative referendums lack some of these
features, but they do not prevent legislators from negotiating across
bills and from thereby accounting for intensities of preference at multiple veto gates.
This analysis, and the Crawford result, appear in tension with
Hunter, but notice that in Hunter, every municipal ordinance targeting
fair housing was subject to the automatic referendum procedure prior
to taking effect.287 This was not an isolated law sent to the voters for
ratification or defeat, but rather a prospective rule governing all laws
in a broad category.288 As a result, those most affected by the law
could not ensure that their seemingly successful bargains over munici284
285
286
287
288

See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
See supra note 275.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
See id.
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pal legislative policy would ever be paid off since a majority of the
electorate could always undo the deal.
C. Rational in Theory, but Fatal in Fact: The Animus Cases289
The preceding analysis also provides the basis for insights into the
Supreme Court’s animus cases, including Romer v. Evans, which
rested on the analysis developed in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. and United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno. Cleburne involved a denial of a special use permit to construct a home for mentally retarded adults,290 and Moreno involved a
denial of food stamps to households with unrelated individuals as applied to, among others, the mother of a hearing impaired girl who
could not afford to live near a special school and thus moved in with
another woman on public assistance.291
Neither of these earlier cases involved direct democracy. In each
case, despite applying deferential rational basis review, the Court
struck down the challenged law on the ground that it evinced a
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,”292 thereby
rendering rational basis review fatal. Although each case is analytically problematic, the doctrinal maneuvers are not difficult to understand. In each case, there is a rational justification independent of
illicit animus, and under traditional rational basis scrutiny, one rational justification is sufficient. In Moreno, despite the compelling circumstances affecting the particular claimant and the fact that the
statutory scheme contains independent welfare fraud provisions,293 it
is not irrational to include supplemental provisions that prohibit benefits to households with unrelated individuals, which are more likely
than households with connected families to include members for purposes of receiving welfare benefits.294 In Cleburne, although unpleasant, it is not irrational that homeowners would be concerned that a
home for mentally retarded adults might reduce property values. Poli289 Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“Finally, we wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ” (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment))).
290 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
291 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532 (1973).
292 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
293 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 536 (“[I]t is important to note that the Food Stamp Act itself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3(e), aimed specifically at the problems of fraud and of
the voluntarily poor.”).
294 Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by households containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose
other than to collect federal food stamps.”).
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cies that preserve property values are hardly irrational. Of course,
similar arguments were rightly rejected as a justification for race- and
religious-based restrictive covenants in place throughout much of
United States history.295 The analytical difficulty in Cleburne is that,
unlike in these contexts, the Court was not willing to classify mentally
retarded adults as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.296 In both Cleburne
and Moreno, the Court ignored or rejected seemingly rational justifications, instead homing in on a single illicit rationale, and then concluded that this rationale alone renders the challenged law illicit.
That, of course, is not standard rational basis review.
Despite this, the justification for the doctrinal maneuver is easily
explained. In many contexts, there are good reasons to distinguish
mentally retarded adults from the general population: for example,
prohibitions on driving and exemptions from particular obligations on
contract.297 Declaring mentally retarded adults suspect, or even quasisuspect, would call into question the presumptive validity of benign
laws distinguishing this group from adults more generally. Similarly in
Moreno, declaring recipients of welfare benefits suspect or quasi-suspect would undermine a host of laws that impose reasonable conditions on the receipt of benefits. And yet, the Court sought to end a
regime that had the effect of imposing unfair conditions on a group of
obviously worthy recipients.
In effect, the Court read out a legitimate rationale for each law to
produce a desired result without having to incur the cost of elevated
scrutiny for the affected class. These cases demonstrate the Court’s
willingness to employ a doctrinal sleight of hand to fit cases within the
illicit animus category to avoid the administrative consequences associated with more candid elevated scrutiny. By excluding other rational justifications to then posit that the actual rationale is illicit, for
cases in the animus category, rational in theory becomes “fatal in
fact.”298
295 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. For the classic judicial treatment, see Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1948), which bootstrapped judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant to avoid the state action barrier that would otherwise have permitted a private agreement
to limit property transfers based on race. One decade earlier, the Supreme Court had already
signaled that state laws distinguishing on the basis of race might be subject to closer scrutiny.
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
296 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. For a discussion of Carolene Products, see infra Part III.D.
297 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
298 For a similar maneuver by Justice Brennan, converting rational basis to the equivalent
of per se invalidity in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680–82 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). For a more detailed analysis, see Stearns, supra note 65, at 1256–57.
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Cleburne and Moreno took on added significance when the Court
extended its animus analysis to Romer v. Evans. The prior analysis,
however, suggests that the animus rationale might have stronger footing in the context of targeted initiatives. Although Colorado Initiative
2 displaced both state and local enactments, the failure of the state
legislature to enact policy on this issue might once more suggest successful state lobbying by the LGBT community, or more generally, a
policy decision to leave this to local decisionmaking. That is the very
policy choice, Justice Scalia argued, that Colorado voters rallied
against.299
As previously discussed, raising the level of decisionmaking in a
multilevel democracy is fair game.300 The problem in Romer, however, is that the initiative process subjected this minority community
to raw majoritarian preferences respecting the underlying policy—inclusion in various antidiscrimination laws—and also the policy choice
respecting the level of decisionmaking itself. Despite the test’s literal
wording, the animus rationale need not entail hatred toward a politically unpopular group. It might be sufficient that the process disallows a group to claim the benefit of prior legislative successes (leaving
this to local rulemaking) or to express intensities of preference
through a legislative process prior to sending the question to the electorate for an up-or-down vote. If the Colorado General Assembly
had first vetted the proposal past its veto gates, after which the resulting proposal was pitched to the voters as a substitute veto, the illicit
animus argument would be more difficult to make. Instead, the initiative process forced a decision on an issue for which a broad constituency of voters might have been largely indifferent.
D. Carolene Products Footnote Four Revisited
By modern lights, United States v. Carolene Products Co. serves
fairly bland fare. The Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge
to a federal statute banning filled milk.301 The law rested on the expressed desire to protect families, and especially children, from an
adulterated product substituting butterfat with vegetable oil.302 Public
choice scholars who have scoured the record have exposed the cost of
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646–47 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra Part III.B.
301 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151, 154 (1938).
302 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397,
400–20 (detailing the history of Carolene Products and the Filled Milk Act of 1923, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 61–63 (2006)).
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this regulatory regime, and the sour motivations of the supportive
fresh milk industry.303 As Professor Geoffrey Miller has shown, filled
milk was a valuable technological innovation benefiting poor rural
families lacking electricity and thus refrigeration.304 Filled milk, a
canned product with a long shelf life, provided children with a dairy
substitute between fresh milk deliveries, which were only good until
the ice block melted.305
Although Carolene Products signaled the end of close scrutiny for
economic regulation following the Lochner v. New York306 era, it is, of
course, better known for its famous footnote four.307 There, Justice
Stone posited that closer judicial scrutiny than rational basis might be
warranted in cases involving protections set out in the Constitution
and also affecting “discrete and insular minorities.”308 Stone’s intuition rests on what modern scholars would call political market failure.
When minorities are outnumbered in the legislative process, they
often fare poorly. One need go no further than Jim Crow to see the
point.
Nothing in this Article belies the claim that when political markets fail, they often harm demographic minorities. But not all political
institutions manifest failure in the same way. One irony of this Article’s analysis is that, to the extent political market failure follows the
law of larger numbers (relative to the minority class that is), then
short of judicial review, legislatures are likely better equipped to protect minority concerns. That is because legislatures offer multiple veto
gates at which to register intense opposition. Of course legislatures
often produce bad results, but as between legislatures and direct democracy, and especially initiatives, there is good reason to suspect that
the latter is relatively less solicitous of concerns affecting discrete and
insular minorities. The Court has formally rejected the process of lawmaking as the basis of presuming against constitutionality.309 This is
undoubtedly bound up in the Court’s longstanding treatment of Guarantee Clause claims as nonjusticiable.310 Although Justice Brennan
See id. at 423 (describing the role of milk industry in passing law).
See id. at 400.
305 See id.
306 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
307 See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 &
n.4 (1982) (describing Carolene Products footnote four as “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law”).
308 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
309 See supra note 267.
310 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
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cleverly maneuvered an independent equal protection claim from a
violation of equally weighted voting,311 formally raising the stakes for
laws enacted through direct democracy would require revisiting over a
century and a half of settled doctrine.
As the preceding analysis shows, however, the Court has sent signals in such cases as Hunter, Seattle School District, and Romer. These
cases demonstrate that sometimes, when the results seem particularly
problematic, the Court is willing to consider process, and in particular,
the antidemocratic aspects of direct democracy, including voter initiatives and automatic referendums, as a factor in decisionmaking.
E. What Direct Democracy Does Well
Within states that use it, direct democracy is a complement to, not
a substitute for, legislative lawmaking. The normative question is
when this complementarity functions well. In the context of groups
fitting the criteria of “discrete and insular minorities”—whether or
not formally categorized as such—there is reason for concern about
direct democracy, especially in the form of citizen initiatives and automatic referendums. But other policy questions—those that go to
budgetary allocations; structural aspects of government (term limits,
tenure of judges, and the like), when expressed neutrally; and issues of
taxation—might be well suited to plebiscites.312 The plebiscite process
is not the only, or necessarily the preferred, method of resolving such
policy issues, but it is a reasonable one when preferences align along
isolated policy dimensions and when the question is the level at which
to set policy. Having the electorate decide along such policy spectra
potentially improves political satisfaction. When targeting legislative
reform, plebiscites carry the added benefit of reducing agency slack.
One need not be a public choice theorist, or a cynic, to recognize that
legislators might not be the best decisionmakers respecting policies
that directly affect them.
Direct democracy in the form of legislative referendums is also a
potentially meritorious way for legislators to validate policies that rest
on inevitable judgment calls concerning which it is difficult to precisely gauge electoral preferences. Although polling provides valuable information, polls are not universally trustworthy and lack
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
See Richard L. Hasen, Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 563 (2004) (defending plebiscites where helpful in avoiding legislative
agency costs).
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institutional legitimacy. The timing of referendums, because they are
tied to fixed election dates, is also harder to manipulate.
Although the empirical data on direct democracy suggests popular support, at least in those states that have it, many scholars have
identified a range of concerns about the quality of laws enacted, the
placement of policy along relevant issue spectra, and outcomes that
fail to account for the particular interests of racial and other minorities.313 Several of the conclusions in this Article have been expressed
elsewhere in the literature. The benefit of the social choice analysis is
providing a common analytical framework for evaluating competing
claims respecting direct democracy.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important contribution of social choice is demonstrating that outcomes do not exist independently of the processes
that generate them. This insight forces consideration not only of the
merits of outcomes, but also of the legitimacy of the process. Both the
process and legitimacy of legislating are affected by the substantive
scope of legislative lawmaking power and by the risk that external
institutions will not honor those deals its members have made.
The history of judicial review has long been concerned with the
institution’s costs to democratic processes. Plebiscites resemble judicial review in that they have the potential to undo implicit or explicit
legislative bargains. But there is an important difference. Judicial decisions are grounded in legal principles and are generally backed up
with written opinions, especially when striking down legislation. Plebiscite voters need not offer any justifications, written or otherwise.
In some respects, the arguments in this Article might be captioned “Direct (Anti-)Republicanism.” After all, the Framers never
anticipated direct democracy in its present form. They anticipated,
and indeed insisted upon, legislative filters, at least at the federal
level. But that is the point. Because outcomes are never entirely independent of the processes that generate them, democracy is not selfdefining. The meaning of democracy turns on our acceptance of legitimating decisional rules that transform our preferences into public
policy. The question of how we set up the rules is as, if not more,
important than the answers to any specific policy questions our democratic system is called upon to provide. When Churchill lamented
democratic processes, except in comparison to other systems, he was
313
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not chiding town meetings. He understood that legislative decisionmaking, and sloppy legislative decisionmaking at that, is democratic
decisionmaking, or at the very least is democratic decisionmaking in
its most practical form. Madison understood that too. This system is
legitimated by the complex filters that we as a society have chosen to
impose in transforming constituent inputs into policy outputs and by
that most important legislative power: the power not to act.
The claim of this Article is not that direct democracy is good or
bad. Rather, the claim is that it is antidemocratic in an important
sense. Plebiscites are antidemocratic when compared with the features of democratic decisionmaking that characterize legislatures, on
the one hand, and the antidemocratic features of appellate courts, on
the other. Recognizing these important characteristics of a pervasive
institution will not end past debates on the wisdom of direct democracy. At a minimum, however, it might help to frame future ones.

